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FROM THE DARK TOWER: UNBRIDLED CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE
Vanita Saleema Snow*
ABSTRACT
The Black Lives Matter movement reinforces that race dominates all
aspects of the judicial system. Police officers are significantly more
likely to stop African Americans than Whites. Even when a stop or
arrest is unwarranted, law enforcement agencies can still profit from
the property seized under the guise of forfeiture statutes. Various state
and federal civil asset forfeiture statutes legitimize law enforcement
seizing cash, homes, cars, and office equipment—all with nominal due
process protections. Despite evidence of discriminatory police
practices, the U.S. Supreme Court deems these forfeiture practices
constitutional.
This article seeks to reignite the conversation about discriminatory
policing and how racially biased policing results in law enforcement
disproportionately seizing African Americans’ property suspected of
being related to illegal activity. But, it also attempts to situate issues
of protest movements as a vehicle to move the Supreme Court to
change discriminatory standards under forfeiture statutes.
“We shall not always plant while others reap
The golden increment of bursting fruit . . . .”1
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of
Law (UDC-DCSL). First, I acknowledge the expert skills of the Drexel Law Review editors.
Thanks to John C. Brittain, Jonathan M. Smith, Julian Cook, LaShanda Adams and members of
the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, where I initially presented the
idea for this article. Andrew Levine, Tijuhna Green, Michael Swink, and Marquel Ramirez
provided research assistance. Additionally, I express gratitude to Yasmin Morais, UDC-DCSL
research librarian, for her research support. I am indebted to the Legal Writing Institute’s
Writers’ Workshop (LWI) and its participants, Cara Cunningham and Lori Johnson, who
provided extremely helpful comments. I also thank Deborah Gordon for her comments and
compassionate mentorship during the LWI workshop. Finally, I am grateful for my colleagues
at UDC-DCSL for their suggestions and the University for providing research funding.
1. 32 COUNTEE CULLEN, From the Dark Tower, in AMERICAN POETS PROJECT 1, 61 (Major
Jackson ed., 2013). Cullen’s From the Dark Tower is a protest poem that reflects the mood of the
Harlem Renaissance. The poem and its title are used as a metaphor for how the U.S. Supreme
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INTRODUCTION
The Black Lives Matter2 movement reawakened America’s
great racial divide.3 With civil unrest, the movement increased
Court addresses issues pertaining to African Americans.
2. About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://
blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2017) (defining the term Black Lives Matters
as “[a] broadening [of] the conversation around state violence to include all of the ways in which
Black people are intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state . . . [and] the ways in which
Black lives are deprived of our basic human rights and dignity”).
3. John Blake, What Black America Won’t Miss About Obama, CNN POL. (July 1, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/30/politics/why-black-america-may-be-relieved-to-seeobama-go/. For some, the election of President Obama meant racial equality had been achieved.
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public scrutiny of discriminatory police practices and the legal
system’s disregard for Black lives. Fourth Amendment rights
have been shamefully trampled and disguised as police officers acting reasonably.4 Killing unarmed Black suspects—
neither justified nor explained—is deemed lawful.5 The Black
Lives Matter movement took hold, in part, because of the
hypocrisy of the criminal justice system and the threat Black
males in particular face under the pretext of public safety.6
Freddie Gray, Michael Brown, Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner,
Tamir Rice, Sandra Bland, and many others, are the sons and
daughters of grieving parents and the victims of a duplicitous
judicial system.7
The judicial system manifests its disregard for Black individuals’ civil liberties in unlawful stops, arrests, and police shootings.8 Police officers are more likely to perform traffic stops on

The racial epithets that surrounded his presidency, however, indicated that America had not
settled the racial equality battle.
4. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (noting that police do not violate the
Fourth Amendment during a seizure as long as police act reasonably); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (same); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816–17 (1996) (holding there
is no need for a balance analysis to determine the constitutionality of an automobile stop even
if motorists commonly violate traffic codes as long as police have probable cause).
5. After the fatal shooting of Michael Brown, a grand jury failed to indict Ferguson police
officer Darren Wilson for Michael Brown’s killing. Moni Basu et al., Fires, Chaos Erupt in Ferguson
After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict in Michael Brown Case, CNN (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/24/justice/ferguson-grand-jury/. Another grand jury also
found no probable cause to indict New York police officer Daniel Pantaleo for the death of Eric
Garner, who could not breathe when the officer continued to hold Mr. Garner in a choke hold.
Andrew Siff et al., Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Death, NBC
N.Y. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Grand-Jury-Decision-EricGarner-Staten-Island-Chokehold-Death-NYPD-284595921.html.
The
trial
of
George
Zimmerman ended in a not guilty verdict for the killing of Trayvon Martin. Greg Botelho &
Holly Yan, George Zimmerman Found Not Guilty of Murder in Trayvon Martin’s Death, CNN (July
14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/justice/zimmerman-trial/.
6. About the Black Lives Matter Network, supra note 2.
7. The names of unarmed black men and women who have died in police custody are
numerous. Although some are commonly known to the general public, the names of others are
limited to their circle of family and friends who remember the incidents of police abuse. For
those victims, I respectfully honor their memory. See generally WSJ News Graphics, From
Ferguson to Dallas: A Recent History of Deaths Involving Police, WALL STREET J. (July 8, 2016),
http://graphics.wsj.com/dallas-police-involved-deaths/ (referencing widely publicized
deaths).
8. See Racial Profiling: Definition, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/racial-profilingdefinition (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
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Blacks than Whites9 and twice as likely to arrest African
Americans than other racial groups during those stops.10 Once
in the criminal justice system, African Americans are more
likely to receive harsher sentences.11 This racially biased policing also results in law enforcement disproportionately seizing
property belonging to African Americans suspected of being
related to illegal activity12 and “policing for profits” within the
Black community.13
Various state and federal civil asset forfeiture statutes legitimize law enforcement seizing cash, homes, cars, and office
equipment with no right to counsel and nominal due process
protections.14 Even when a stop or arrest is unwarranted, law
enforcement agencies can still seize property under the guise of
forfeiture statutes, and the U.S. Supreme Court deems such
practices constitutional.15
For example, the Philadelphia Police Department seized seventy-one-year-old Elizabeth Young’s vehicle when her fifty9. The ACLU describes several instances where racial profiling has resulted in death. In the
case of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed twenty-two-year-old male immigrant from New Guinea,
four white officers shot Diallo nineteen times. The state attorney general studied the unit and
found that “blacks were stopped at a rate 10 times that of whites, and that 35 percent of those
stops lacked reasonable suspicion to detain or had reports insufficiently filled out to make a
determination.” Id.
10. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING
RACIAL
INEQUITY
IN
THE
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
11
(2015),
http://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/black-lives-matter-eliminating-racial-inequity-inthe-criminal-justice-system/.
11. Id. at 12; Tamara F. Lawson, Teaching Civil Rights: Mainstreaming Civil Rights in the Law
School Curriculum: Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 837, 855 n.112 (2010).
12. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE?
4–15 (1995); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 76–96 (2016) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D.],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download.
13. See MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 6 (2010), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/
assetforfeituretoemail.pdf. The term “policing for profits” is commonly used to describe the
incentive created by state and federal laws that allow law enforcement to keep some or all of
the proceeds from civil asset forfeiture.
14. See generally Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2466, 2467 (2016) (providing a comprehensive authority for civil asset forfeiture). Claimants
have a right to appointed counsel if the forfeiture involves a claimant’s residential home. Id.
§ 983(b)(2)(A).
15. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 449–50 (1996); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–81 (1974).
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year-old son pleaded guilty to selling marijuana out of her
vehicle and home.16 The aggregate street value of the marijuana
was approximately $140. At the time the marijuana sales
occurred, Ms. Young’s son and grandchildren lived with her,
but the police never suspected she was involved in the marijuana transactions. Significantly, Ms. Young was ill and her
doctor had placed her on bed rest when the marijuana sales
occurred. Nonetheless, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s
office initiated forfeiture proceedings and seized Ms. Young’s
home and vehicle through Pennsylvania’s forfeiture statute.17
Ms. Young was never charged with a crime.18
The initial forfeiture court proceeding began in May 2012, but
it was not until May 2017 that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissed the forfeiture against Ms. Young’s home
and ordered the government to return her vehicle.19 For five
years, Ms. Young was prohibited from living in her home, and
she was without her vehicle all because her son sold a few
grams of marijuana.20
The data show Ms. Young is not an anomaly. Many forfeiture
claims involve property owners involved in traffic stops, Terry
stops, and low-level crimes.21 Although the Supreme Court
holds the discriminatory implementation of civil forfeiture
constitutional,22 the Court has acknowledged through
concurring opinions, dicta, and dissents that the civil forfeiture
process leads to unjust results. Recently, Justice Thomas stated,
“the poor and other groups [are] least able to defend their

16. Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet and Contents Seized from Young, 160 A.3d 153, 158–
59 (Pa. 2017).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 160.
19. Id. at 197.
20. Id. at 159.
21. Significantly, many civil asset forfeiture seizures have values below $1500. HYDE, supra
note 12, at 32; see also DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE
ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 29 (2d ed. 2015); Lauren Carasik, Holder Assails Policing for
Profit, ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/holderassails-policing-for-profit.html.
22. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 449–50 (1996); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–81 (1974).
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interests in forfeiture proceedings.”23 Despite the justice
disparity, civil forfeiture remains constitutional.
In this Article, I argue Black Lives Matter and its sister
organizations, collectively The Movements for Black Lives, can
serve as an impetus to shift the U.S. Supreme Court’s views on
civil asset forfeiture. In fact, the Court is the proper venue: The
civil rights movement sparked the Brown v. Board of Education
holding;24 the women’s rights movement led to Roe v. Wade;25
the LGBTQIA movement shifted views on same-sex marriage
leading to the Obergefell v. Hodges holding.26
Part I of this Article surveys the evolution of civil forfeiture
actions, including an analysis of the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) and its historical purpose.27 Part
II examines how law enforcement police for profits—prioritizing crimes based on forfeiture income potential rather than
public safety. Part III provides examples of selective policing
and how forfeiture laws systematically dispossess African
Americans of their property and shift ownership to law enforcement entities. Part IV analyzes the nexus between social
activism and constitutional reform, using Brown v. Board of
Education and Roe v. Wade as examples. Finally, Part V assesses
what the Black Lives Matter movement has already accomplished and what it can accomplish in the realm of civil asset
forfeiture.
I.

EVOLUTION OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE

Before examining the relationship between social activism
and civil asset forfeiture, it is helpful to understand the guiding
federal law authorizing civil asset forfeiture and its origin.28
23. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017).
24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF
CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (Dan Gerstle ed., 2016).
26. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see COLE, supra note 25, at 91–93.
27. See Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (1948).
28. Perhaps, the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) authority to seize assets for unpaid taxes
is the most commonly known forfeiture process, but even the IRS seizure policies have been
challenged due to abusive enforcement procedures. I.R.C. §§ 6330–44 (2016); IRM 5.10.1–5.10.1.5

SNOW, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 69.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FROM THE DARK TOWER

5/4/18 1:02 PM

75

Traces of civil asset forfeiture have deep roots and are found as
early as the eleventh century in the “law of deodands.”29
Contemporary civil asset forfeiture, however, gained
momentum in the eighties when the proverbial war on drugs
began.30 A newly established criminal forfeiture statute served
as a valuable tool in the “tough on crime” crusade, but the
forfeiture practices ultimately led to widespread law enforcement abuse.31 In 2000, Congress enacted CAFRA to address
some of the misuse.32 With continued concern about unjust
forfeiture practices, the House Judiciary Committee of the 115th
U.S. Congress recently introduced civil asset forfeiture
legislation to remedy the unjust practices.33 These four central
periods are explained below.
A. Historical Origins
The Department of Justice (DOJ), the agency benefiting the
most from forfeiture, defines civil judicial forfeiture as “an in
rem (against the property) action brought in court against the
(May 20, 2016); Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Tightens Its Procedures for Seizing Property, WASH. POST
(Dec. 3, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ politics/1997/12/ 03/irs-tightensits-procedures-for-seizing-property/94035886-d90a-4c66-9e8fdc2565d36d8d/?utm_term=.460937902652.
29. See Andrew Crawford, Civil Asset Forfeiture in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure
and Its Impact on Indigent Property Owners, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 257, 260–61 (2015).
30. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons
from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 90–91 (1996); Annemarie Bridy, Carpe
Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 694–95
(2014); see also Ron Champoux, Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal Drug Laws: Does the
Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 250 (1992) (“Today, . . . forfeiture
is used as a powerful method for attacking drug felony violations.”).
31. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 2; see also WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 13, at 10–11
(“With these changes, the modern era of policing and prosecuting for profit had begun.”).
32. Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government
Forfeiture Authority And Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 97 (2001);
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 2. But see Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil
Asset Forfeiture and the Problems It Creates, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 315, 315 (2017) (“When
criminals take property, the law calls it theft. When law enforcement confiscates property, the
process is called civil asset forfeiture.”).
33. See Deterring Undue Enforcement by Protecting Rights of Citizens from Excessive
Searches and Seizures Act of 2017, H.R. 1795, 115th Cong. (2017); Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses
and Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 8 (2015) [hereinafter Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and
Reforms].
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property. The property is the defendant and no criminal charge
against the owner is necessary.”34 The Justice Department’s
definition does not indicate the property owner is denied a predeprivation hearing,35 and often there is neither a criminal
charge nor conviction against anyone. Although criminal asset
forfeiture proceedings are in personam actions requiring a
corresponding criminal charge before law enforcement may
seize property, civil asset forfeiture has no such requirement.36
Instead, civil forfeiture actions are fictitiously deemed in rem,37
and seizure is therefore merely based on whether a law
enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that the
property is connected to illegal activity.38 To meet its probable
cause standard, law enforcement may rely on hearsay evidence
and other highly unreliable and prejudicial evidence, such as
affidavits from police officers involved in the investigation.39
Courts attribute the origins of treating civil forfeiture as an in
rem action, in part, due to the Old Testament and the law of
deodands.40 An often quoted Biblical verse used to support the
origins of forfeiture provides “If an ox gore a man or a woman,
that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh
shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.”41
English common law similarly deemed property to have
34. Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federalforfeiture (last updated Feb. 1, 2017).
35. Id. The breadth of the Fifth Amendment pre-deprivation hearing violations is beyond
the scope of this article; however, the author recognizes the problem and plans to address the
issue in a subsequent article.
36. See Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.
(Apr.
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download
[hereinafter Equitable Sharing].
37. Id. Criminal forfeiture actions are in personam actions and provide greater due process
protections to the property owner than civil forfeiture proceedings. The method of seizing
property may occur through administrative action or judicial proceeding—either civil or
criminal. See, e.g., United States v. $106,647 in U.S. Currency, 93 F. Supp. 3d 419 (D. Md. 2015).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) (2016).
39. See United States v. All Right, Title & Interest in Five Parcel of Real Prop., 830 F. Supp.
750, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See generally State ex rel. Woods v. Filler, 818 P.2d 209 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the statute permitting hearsay evidence constitutional in meeting probable
cause).
40. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
41. Exodus 21:28 (King James); see LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE
OF PROPERTY 7 (1996).
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powers to commit crimes and thus held the property
accountable for its actions, without holding the owner liable.42
This history is relevant because the U.S. Supreme Court referenced this antiquity when it held civil asset forfeiture was
constitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.43
Although the in rem guilty-property syndrome in laws of deodands may have served both cultural and societal needs,44
contemporary forfeiture laws diverge far from those purposes.45
B. Contemporary Forfeiture
Currently, there are over 140 federal civil forfeiture statutes.46
The purpose of these contemporary forfeiture statutes was to
derail the profits from organized crime, including drug
trafficking.47 As part of that strategy, Congress enacted the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)—
the first criminal forfeiture statute.48 As additional ammunition
for the proverbial “war on drugs,”49 Congress enacted the
42. By separating the property from its owner, the crown need not find the owner culpable
to import punishment against the property through seizure. Paul Schiff Berman, An
Anthropological Approach to Modern Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against
Objects, 11 YALE J.L. & HUM. 1, 5, 42, 45 (1999); Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical
Perspective on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 169, 181 (1973).
43. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680.
44. Berman, supra note 42, at 3–6.
45. Significantly, in customs and admiralty law forfeiture municipalities lacking jurisdiction over the person, an in rem action was the only recourse, leading to the government confiscating contraband and vehicles used to transport contraband. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442, 472 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Also, a number of forfeiture statutes served to expand
executive powers to seize private property under war and military powers. See Second War
Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176; War Powers Act of 1941, ch. 593, 55 Stat. 838;
Departmental Reorganization (Overman) Act, ch. 78, 40 Stat. 556 (1918).
46. DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 24 (3d ed. 2014).
47. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 30.
48. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2016); see
130 CONG. REC. S14,209 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984); William H. Erickson & William D.
Neighbors, Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field:
1983–1984, 103 F.R.D. 187, 298–99 (1985). RICO served as a model for many state forfeiture
statutes. EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 37.
49. Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 27 (1994) (discussing
how the war on drugs disproportionately targeted African Americans).
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (the Act).50 The Act
expanded law enforcement’s ability to combat crimes related to
drug activity and provided for the forfeiture of property used
to facilitate those crimes.51 Arguably, the most expansive
aspects of the Act came in 1992 and included financial fraud and
other commercial matters,52 providing the DOJ greater
authority to seize private property without a criminal conviction.53
Despite seemingly justifiable reasons to remove the profit
from criminal activity, Congress drafted the Act so broadly that
law enforcement could seize assets vaguely considered the
proceeds of illicit activity.54 These broadly drafted federal and
state statutes have led to widespread forfeiture abuse and odd
consequences.55 Forfeiture actions include seizing “suspicious”
cash from motorists during minor traffic stops56 and seizing
homes when any of the residents possess illicit drugs.57 In
50. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
51. Id. But see United States v. $31,990 in United States Currency, 982 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.
1993) (“While we recognize the formidable task faced by the government in its war on drugs,
we decline to condone the abuse of civil forfeiture as a means to winning that war.”). In the
early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan professed a “war on drugs” that was designed to combat
the rampant drug-related crimes occurring in the inner cities. These federal policies were
modeled after New York’s Governor Rockefeller who initiated a war on drugs through a series
of mandatory minimum sentence legislation. See Brian Gilmore, Again and Again We Suffer: The
Poor and the Endurance of the “War on Drugs,” 15 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 59, 66–67 (2011). Although
the war initially took a therapeutic approach, the campaign later resulted in mass incarceration
of African America men in particular. Id. at 66.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(D) (2016); HYDE, supra note 12, at 25.
53. HYDE, supra note 12, at 25. Prior to the Act, forfeited assets went to the general
government fund, not the DOJ. Id. at 26–27.
54. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 13, at 20–22; see also Mary Cheh, Constitutional Limits on
Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1333 (1991) (referencing the use of civil
forfeiture as “an explicit alternative to criminal prosecution”). I, however, argue it is more
commonly used as an implicit alternative to criminal prosecution.
55. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 43 (1995) (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634 (1989)) (“[B]road forfeiture provisions carry the potential for
government abuse and ‘can be devastating when used unjustly.’”). See generally Ron
Champoux, Note, Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal Drug Laws: Does the Punishment Outweigh
the Crime?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 249 (1992) (proposing the use of the Disproportionate
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment to ensure the seizure of property is proportional
punishment for the crime).
56. See United States v. $38,005 in United States Currency, No. 5:15-CV-27-REW, 2016 WL
3545427, at *1 (E.D. Ky. 2016).
57. See United States v. Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 109 (S.D.

SNOW, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 69.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FROM THE DARK TOWER

5/4/18 1:02 PM

79

Bennis v. Michigan, the Court held Michigan police properly
seized the vehicle of John Bennis, a man who entertained
prostitutes in his family vehicle.58 Mr. Bennis’s wife neither
authorized nor knew her husband was picking up prostitutes
in their jointly owned vehicle.59 Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion expressed concern regarding the constitutionality of
innocent property owners having their property subjected to
forfeiture, yet justified the forfeiture practice because it is
embedded in the American judicial system and has deep roots
in English common law.60
The Bennis Court sent a message of uncertainty concerning
equity and civil asset forfeiture. Supplementing Justice
Thomas’s concerns, Justice Stevens’s dissent asserted neither
“logic nor history” supports forfeiting the property of an
innocent owner who lacks knowledge that property was used
for illegal means.61 Justice Stevens distinguished the case from
precedent because Ms. Bennis lacked culpability, and there was
a weak nexus between the vehicle and the prostitution.62 The
majority, however, adhered to common law traditions and
upheld the state’s seizure of the family vehicle.63
Although the Court has expressed concerns about forfeiture
abuses,64 a series of cases have consistently held civil asset
forfeiture is not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, and property owners are not entitled to preseizure notice or hearing.65 The glaring injustices of forfeiture
Tex. 1988).
58. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A)
(2016), as recognized in United States v. Ferro, 681 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Bennis was a 5–
4 opinion with two concurring opinions filed. 516 U.S. at 457.
59. Id. at 444.
60. Id. at 453. See generally Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law with
a Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 265, 271 (1995) (referencing the jurisdictional element of civil forfeiture).
Under English common law, the King could seize a person’s property because it was “an offense
to the King’s peace, which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property.” Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
61. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 458–59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 462–63.
63. Id. at 453 (majority opinion).
64. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 43 (1995).
65. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 678–79; see also United States v. Eight Thousand Eight
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actions were demonstrated in another high profile case, Acadia
Technology, Inc. v. United States.66 In Acadia, the owners of computer fans brought suit against the United States and sought to
recover for an unconstitutional taking based on depreciation in
value while the fans were in government custody.67 The fans
had been in custody for more than four years after the United
States Customs Service seized them under the Tariff Act.68 The
court held that the unreasonable delay in returning the fans was
not a taking.69
To justify these extraordinary practices, courts consistently
rely on states’ broad policing power during a pending criminal
investigation.70 The problem with that reasoning is many civil
asset forfeitures have no parallel criminal proceeding,71
suggesting the process violates the Takings Clause.
Additionally, because the civil forfeiture is deemed an in rem
action, the government conducts warrantless seizures based on
probable cause,72 and unless the forfeiture involves a residential home, claimants are not entitled to pre-deprivation
notice or hearing.73 Although the proceedings lack sufficient
procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court remains unwilling
to hold forfeiture is a deprivation of due process. 74
Hundred & Fifty dollars ($8,850) in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1983)
(determining whether three part inquiry permits forfeiture without notice or a pre-seizure
hearing); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (considering “(1) the private interest
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural
requirements would impose.”).
66. 458 F.3d 1327, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
67. Id. at 1329–30.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1328.
70. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996). In Bennis, the innocent wife argued
that the abatement/forfeiture of the car was a violation of the takings clause because “the
government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already
lawfully acquired.” Id.
71. EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 8.
72. Id.
73. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993) (describing
the competing interests involved in making exceptions to the necessity of a pre-deprivation
hearing).
74. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452–53.
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C. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA)75
Increased public awareness of the unexpected consequences
of civil asset forfeiture captured the attention of the general
public, the media, and Congress.76 There were three common
concerns. First, the threshold to seize property was too low
when measured against the barriers claimants faced to challenge a forfeiture action.77 Second, law enforcement’s prioritization of crimes was based on forfeiture income potential, not
public safety.78 Finally, public sentiment about racial disparities in the criminal justice system and discriminatory
policing suggested a need to restructure civil forfeiture
statutes.79
Republican Congressman Henry Hyde was particularly
concerned with the unjust results of civil forfeiture actions and
spearheaded congressional reform.80 In his book titled Forfeiting Our Property Rights, he revealed the glaring disparities that
led him to understand the unwarranted consequences civil
forfeiture has on innocent third parties.81 These stories were the
impetus for Congressman Hyde to lead the enactment of H.R.
1658 and the passing of CAFRA.82
75. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466, 2467
(2016).
76. See generally Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Sari Horwitz & Steven Rich, Holder Limits Seized-Asset
Sharing Process that Split Billions with Local, State Police, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/holder-ends-seized-asset-sharing-processthat-split-billions-with-local-state-police/2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc
_story.html?utm_term=.d74f38da7520 [hereinafter O’Harrow et al.] (emphasizing the praise
drawn from organizations who have denounced the seizing of assets); Michael Sallah, Robert
O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of
Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/?utm_term=.fd32
6b779f19 [hereinafter Sallah et al.] (describing the controversial nature of these practices).
77. HYDE, supra note 12, at 6–7.
78. Id. at 29–30.
79. Id. at 43–45.
80. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466, 2467 (2016).
81. See HYDE, supra note 12.
82. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2466,
2467. Although there is limited legislative history on CAFRA, its predecessor bill has extensive
legislative history, including Henry Hyde’s 1996 committee report and Senator Sessions’s floor
statement. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-192 (1999). With his recent appointment as Attorney General,
it will be interesting to see the role Sessions will play in CAFRA reform.
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CAFRA was a bipartisan bill that took four years to
conceive.83 House Judicial Committee Chairman Henry Hyde
introduced the final version, with the support of fifty-nine cosponsors and a diverse coalition of supporters.84 The bill was
intended to address the inherently flawed manner in which
federal jurisdictions implemented civil asset forfeiture, but
like many amendments to legislation, the bill required compromises.85 Arguably, those compromises led to a bill that failed
to provide sufficient due process safeguards to property
owners. Representative Hyde’s floor statement reflects the
attempts to conciliate law enforcement:
H.R. 1658 also contains a number of provisions
addressing the needs of the Justice Department
and State and local law enforcement.
These include increasing the availability of
criminal forfeiture and the civil forfeiture of the
proceeds of crimes . . . .

83. See George Leef, Sessions Has No Problem with Civil Asset Forfeiture—And That’s a Problem,
FORBES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2017/ 01/03/sessions-hasno-problem-with-civil-asset-forfeiture-and-thats-a-problem. See generally Cassella, supra note
32, at 98 (noting CAFRA was enacted after four years of competing bills between the United
States House and the Senate). Although there is limited legislative history on CAFRA, its
preceding bills have extensive legislative history, including Henry Hyde’s 1999 committee
report. See H.R. REP. No. 106-192 (1999). At the time, Henry Hyde served as Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and John Conyers, Jr. served as a Member of the House of
Representatives for District 14. Also, Senator Sessions’s floor statement is particularly notable,
which introduced the Department of Justice’s Sessions-Schumer counter proposal to the HydeConyers bill.
84. In his floor statement, Senator Hatch referenced the compromises with the DOJ, Senator
Sessions, and Senator Schumer and acknowledged the organizations supporting the bill.
A broad coalition of organizations supported this bill, including the
Chamber of Commerce, the American Bankers Association, the National
Association of Homebuilders, the National Association of Realtors, the
Institute for Justice, Americans for Tax Reform, the National Rifle
Association, the American Bar Association, and the Fraternal Order of
Police. Also, six former Attorneys General—William Barr, Richard
Thornburg, Edwin Meese, Benjamin Civiletti, Griffin Bell, and Nicholas
Katzenbach—endorsed the bill.
146 CONG. REC. 3654 (2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
85. Significantly, CAFRA does not include all forfeiture statutes. For example, IRS
forfeitures, customs forfeitures, and interstate commerce forfeitures are all exempt from the
procedural protections enumerated in CAFRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(i).
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This bill is one we can all be proud of.86
Perhaps law enforcement could take pride in CAFRA, but
property owners could not. While CAFRA enhanced some
protections for property owners, it also expanded the
government’s ability to use forfeiture in more crime-related
circumstances and retained the low probable cause standard.87
The major CAFRA reforms are highlighted below.
1.

Shifts in the burden of proof

After seizing property, the government has sixty days to
notify any potential property owners.88 Before CAFRA, the
property owner bore the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not subject to forfeiture.89 Now, the government bears the burden to establish a
“substantial connection” between the property seized and the
illegal activity, or that the property is criminal proceeds, by a
preponderance of the evidence.90 Before the government is
forced to meet its burden, however, the property owner must
file a claim to the property within thirty-five days of receiving
notice of the government seizure.91 That procedural requirement is riddled with complications. Because forfeiture is an in
rem action, many property owners never receive actual notice
of the seizure.92 If the claimant fails to file the claim timely, law

86. 146 CONG. REC. H2040 (2000) (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
87. Law enforcement must have probable cause to assert successfully the asset was
connected to illegal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B) (2016).
88. Id. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i).
89. Id. § 983(c)(1); 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2016); see also HYDE, supra note 12, at 55 (“The law
reverses the normal presumption of innocence, presuming the property ‘guilty’ unless the
owner can prove otherwise.”).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c).
91. Id. § 983(a)(2)(b). Pre-CAFRA, the property owner had to post a bond to challenge a
forfeiture action. 19 U.S.C. § 1608; see, e.g., Faldraga v. Carnes, 674 F. Supp. 845, 845 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (granting defendant United States Custom Services’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to post a bond under § 1608). CAFRA, however, dispensed with that
requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(E).
92. See Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2483 (2016)
(“[M]odern rules prescribing the procedure for in rem forfeiture actions require the government to send personalized notice to people with known interests in the property.”). Without
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enforcement administratively seizes the property if its value is
below $500,000.93 Predictably, the majority of federal civil forfeiture cases are not challenged.94 Thus, the initial seizure’s
validity is rarely reviewed.95
For claimants who meet the thirty-five-day deadline, the
government then has ninety days to file a verified forfeiture
complaint, initiating the judicial forfeiture process.96 The judicial forfeiture action has the formalities of any district court
proceeding.97 If the property owner survives these additional
procedural hurdles, including the government’s likely motion
for summary judgment, the government presents its case-inchief.98
The government may use circumstantial evidence to show the
property was either used or intended to be used to commit a
crime or facilitated the commission thereof.99 Circumstantial
evidence commonly includes establishing the property owner
lacks legitimate income to justify the asset.100 Police dog alerts
actual notice, few property owners know that their time to challenge the forfeiture action in a
judicial proceeding will expire in thirty-five days after the seizure. See David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 13 NEV. L.J. 1, 28 (2012) (“The high
number of uncontested forfeitures may be a product, at least in part, of failures of notice.”).
93. See Mendoza v. U.S. Custom & Border Prot., Civ. Action 05-6017, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65174, at *12–16 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2006). Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1608, with Cassella, supra note
32, at 128 (comparing the notice and claim requirements for assets valued above and below
$500,000).
94. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 12.
95. Id.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A). If the government fails to initiate a judicial action, it must
release the property to the claimant. Id.
97. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 124 (“In federal and state forfeiture practice, the
general rules of civil procedure apply unless they are inconsistent with the forfeiture statute.”).
98. Id.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3); see EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 155 (“Forfeitures may be
established both by direct and circumstantial evidence and neither is entitled to any greater
weight as a form of proof.”). Forfeitable property typically falls into four categories: (1)
instrumentalities/facilitating property; (2) criminal proceeds; (3) illegal contraband; and (4)
enterprises. EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 11–16. With contraband, there is no property right,
so a claimant does not have standing to challenge its forfeiture. Id. at 11–12. In other instances,
the government must establish a substantial connection between the property and the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3). The standard is designed to require that the property have more than an
incidental connection to the crime. United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“At minimum, the property must have more than an incidental or fortuitous connection to
criminal activity.”).
100. See United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 2003)
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to money with drug traces are also commonly used as government evidence, despite drug traces on money in circulation
being prevalent.101 If the government meets its burden, which it
usually does, the property owner may assert as a general
defense that there is an insufficient nexus between the property
and the alleged criminal activity.102 A claimant may also assert
the innocent owner defense.103
2.

Innocent owner defense

Perhaps the most needed CAFRA reform was the innocent
owner defense.104 Before CAFRA, however, property was subject to forfeiture even if the owner lacked knowledge that the
property was used for illegal means—a concern the Bennis
Court referenced but declined to change.105 Now, a claimant
establishes an innocent owner defense by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the property owner did not
(holding that the government met its burden by showing major disparity between claimant’s
tax returns over a five-year period and money found in the claimant’s safe-deposit box).
101. While dog alerts are not independently strong enough to establish that property
constitutes “proceeds,” courts consider dog sniffs to be highly probative due to empirical
evidence of dog-sniff reliability. See United States v. $30,670 in U.S. Funds, 403 F.3d 459, 448
(7th Cir. 2005) (considering scientific evidence showing that a properly trained dog would not
be alerted to innocently contaminated currency, even if exposed to a large number of bills); see
also United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 462 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding a dog sniff was probative
if supported by other evidence, which included $16,000 in cash found in a shoe box of the
defendant’s car). But see United States v. $506,201 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[W]e are unwilling to take seriously the evidence of the post-seizure dog sniff . . . . Even
the government admits that no one can place much stock in the results of dog sniffs because at
least one-third of the currency in the United States is contaminated with cocaine in any event.”);
Muhammed v. Drug Enf’t Agency, 92 F.3d 648, 653 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding a dog alert is
“virtually meaningless” because “an extremely high percentage of all cash in circulation in
America today is contaminated with drug-residue.”).
102. EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 170–75.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
104. See generally J. William Snyder, Jr., Reining in Civil Forfeiture Law and Protecting Innocent
Owners from Civil Asset Forfeiture: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1333
(1994) (explaining why the Supreme Court first recognized the innocent owner defense).
105. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 455 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). The Bennis Court
sent a message of uncertainty concerning equity and civil asset forfeiture. Specifically, in Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion, he acknowledged the inequities embedded in law enforcement’s
ability to seize innocent parties’ property; he concluded that the process is constitutional
because of the long-standing accepted practice. Id. at 454–55. These deep roots have impeded
progress and the Courts wherewithal to deem the civil forfeiture, as currently implemented,
unconstitutional. Id.
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know the property was connected to illegal activity.106 A property owner, however, cannot willfully ignore criminal activity.107 Instead, the claimant must establish that he or she did
all that reasonably could be expected to end the illegal use of
the property, such as calling the police.108 The innocent owner
defense may also apply to a bona fide purchaser or seller who
did not know that the property was involved in illegal activity
and subject to forfeiture.109
Despite the innocent owner triumph, the defense is somewhat of a hollow victory because the claimants who could raise
an innocent owner defense often do not. Two main factors
account for this problem, including the procedural hurdles to
assert the defense and the lack of counsel to assist in the court
proceedings.110 As outlined below, claimants who choose to
raise the defense often wait over six months before a judge
reviews the matter―during that time claimants are without
their cars, money, or whatever property law enforcement
seized.

106. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
107. United States v. One Parcel of Prop., 985 F.2d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[W]here an owner
has engaged in ‘willful blindness’ as to activities occurring on her property, her ignorance will
not entitle her to avoid forfeiture.”). If the person is aware of the illegal activity or involved in
the activity, he or she forfeits this element of the defense. See United States v. Collado, 348 F.3d
323, 328 (2d Cir. 2003). In Collado, a building owner, who was the mother of a drug trafficking
defendant who had lived in and dealt drugs out of building, had willfully ignored trafficking.
Id. at 327. The owner admitted she suspected her son of drug involvement, and admitted her
suspicions that defendant “may have been getting involved with drugs again” after his release
from prison. Id. The owner conceded that $20 million worth of drug transactions occurred in or
around her building over the course of a year. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii); see also United States v. 16328 S. 43rd E. Ave., 275 F.3d 1281,
1285 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding an “owner consents to drug use in her property if she fails ‘to take
all reasonable steps to prevent illicit use of [the] premises once [she] acquires knowledge of that
use’”).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A).
110. To qualify for the innocent owner defense, one must prove that she “(i) did not know
of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such
use of the property.” Id. § 983(d)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
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Although a claimant can file a hardship petition to expedite the
property’s release,111 most claimants would require assistance
of counsel. Access to counsel, however, is not readily available
to low-income claimants.
3.

Attorneys’ fees and the right to counsel

Lack of counsel is a barrier for claimants defending against
any civil action, and CAFRA is no different.112 Under CAFRA,
there is no right to counsel unless the claimant is indigent and
there is a corresponding criminal matter or if the forfeiture is
for the claimant’s residential home.113
Access to counsel ostensibly levels the proverbial playing
field between property owners and the government, but the

111. CAFRA includes waivers for property owners to file requesting the release of the
property pending final disposition. Id. § 983(f)(1)(A)–(D).
112. See David Baarlaer, Going Pro Se: Handling Legal Problems on Your Own, LAWYERS.COM
(Sept. 16, 2011), https://blogs.lawyers.com/2011/09/going-pro-se-handling-legal-problemson-your-own/ (“Pro se litigants lose, and sometime lose before they see the inside of a
courtroom.”). The Justice Department’s Ferguson report revealed that if a defendant charged
with a failure to appear is represented by counsel, the police department’s policy was to dismiss
the arrest warrant associated with the failure to appear. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2015) [hereinafter
INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON P.D.], https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=95274; United
States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding prosecutor’s ability to restrain
the accused citizens’ property before trial hinders claimant’s ability to hire counsel).
113. See David Smith, A Comparison of Federal Civil and Criminal Forfeiture Procedures: Which
Provides More Protections for Property Owners?, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 30, 2015),
http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/comparison-federal-civil-and-criminalforfeiture-procedures-which-provides.
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right alone is insufficient.114 Many forfeitures are unchallenged
because the property value is too low to justify hiring an
attorney.115 Moreover, the law presumes petitioners can challenge state action in a judicial proceeding without considering
power dynamics and socio-economic factors.116 The state
prosecutor has the power to file criminal charges against the
innocent property owner. The chilling effect of criminal
prosecution expands for those lacking racial or economic
privilege.117 Ultimately, the lack of counsel and the inferential
threat of prosecution may deter claimants from challenging
police action.
D. Recent Reform
Issues concerning access to counsel and police abuse of authority with forfeiture practices resonate with members of
Congress and their constituents.118 The latest CAFRA legislative reform was on March 29, 2017, when the House Judiciary
Committee approved H.R. 1795, known as the Deterring Undue
Enforcement by Protecting Rights of Citizens from Excessive
Searches and Seizures Act of 2017 (Due Process Act).119
The bill’s focus is to protect innocent Americans and their

114. Pre-CAFRA, the Federal Circuit in Acadia Technology, Inc. v. United States described the
alternative remedies the petitioners had at their disposal, including filing for a forfeiture action
or request to refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney, and then file a motion for return of property.
458 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The court stated:
[A] property owner may force the government either to return the property or to initiate forfeiture proceedings. If the government commences
forfeiture proceedings after an inordinate delay, the owner may file a
motion with the court requesting dismissal of the proceeding and return of
his property on the ground that the delay has violated his due process
rights, even if the property would otherwise be forfeitable.
Id.
115. See HYDE, supra note 12, at 32.
116. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 29; see also Carasik, supra note 21 (discussing the
disproportionate impact civil asset forfeiture has on the poor and minorities).
117. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 29; Carasik, supra note 21.
118. Although attorneys’ fees are authorized under CAFRA, few attorneys would be
incentivized to accept a case where the assets seized average under $1434. HYDE, supra note 12,
at 32.
119. H.R. 1795, 115th Cong. (2017). H.R. 1795’s predecessor was H.R. 5283, 114th Cong.
(2016).
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property rights.120 Chairman Goodlatte also emphasized the
protections for innocent owners against undue government
delays in returning seized property.121 Correspondingly, the
Due Process Act seeks to remove the financial incentives
embedded in forfeiture.122 Ranking Member Conyers shared
concerns about protections for innocent owners and stressed
the Due Process Act “will take significant additional steps to
prevent unjust seizures and make the procedures concerning
federal asset forfeiture less burdensome for innocent property
owners.”123 His position reflects the sentiment of other
Committee members, in particular, Chairmen Goodlatte and
Sensenbrenner.124
Noting the burden forfeiture places on Americans whose
property is intrinsic to basic survival, Congresswoman Jackson
Lee125 stressed, “[F]or an unusual process whereby the government may seize and forfeit someone’s money, car, or other
assets they need to sustain themselves, the standard should be
higher. Therefore, [the Due Process Act] would elevate the
burden on the government from ‘preponderance of the evidence’ to ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”126
Henry Hyde proposed a clear and convincing burden of proof

120. Chairman Goodlatte emphasized that the Act “protect[s] Americans . . . .” House
Judiciary Committee Approves Bill to Protect Americans’ Property Rights, U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON JUDICIARY DEMOCRATS (May 25, 2016), https://democrats-judiciary.house.gov/news/
press-releases/house-judiciary-committee-approves-bill-protect-americans-property-rights
[hereinafter House Judiciary Approves Bill]. Chairman Sensenbrenner stated, [T]he Due Process
Act makes common sense changes to federal forfeiture laws that help innocent Americans.” Id.
121. Specifically, the Due Process Act “[s]peeds up the process for the government to notify
the property owner of a seizure [and] [e]xpands protections to innocent owners by requiring
the government to prove the connection between the property and the offense and that the
property was used intentionally in order to seize it.” Id.
122. H.R. 5283, 114th Cong. (2016) (instituting clear and convincing evidentiary standard on
the government to prove the claimant is not an innocent owner).
123. House Judiciary Approves Bill, supra note 120.
124. Id. (noting the Due Process Act “strengthens protections for Americans whose property
has been seized by law enforcement agencies”).
125. About, U.S. CONGRESSWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE, https://jacksonlee.house.gov/
about (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee is the 18th Congressional
District of Texas and is a senior member of the House Committees on the Judiciary and Homeland Security. Id.
126. House Judiciary Approves Bill, supra note 120.
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standard when he introduced an early version of CAFRA,127 but
the bill never made it out of the Committee because law
enforcement zealously opposed the suggested standard. As a
compromise, the preponderance of the evidence standard
prevailed.128 It is likely law enforcement will show similar
resistance to the Due Process Act.
If the Committee releases the bill as drafted, the innocent
owner defense will be strengthened significantly. Under the
new standard, the government would bear the burden to show
clear and convincing evidence that the third party is not an
innocent owner.129 Shifting the burden to the government
should increase claimants’ ability to retain their property.
Under CAFRA, the provision governing attorneys’ fees is still
limited to matters involving a residence and claimants with a
related criminal matter.130 The Due Process Act, however,
would allow a claimant to recoup attorneys’ fees if the matter
settles for more than 50% of the value of the property that the
government seized.131 Civil Gideon advocates would assert that
all litigants should have a right to counsel in these matters,
regardless of whether they prevail.132 Without that guarantee,
attorneys are less likely to represent claimants on a contingency
basis in forfeiture proceedings.133
The Due Process Act contains additional shortcomings.
Particularly, pre-deprivation notices and hearing requirements
would remain unchanged.134 Furthermore, the onus remains
127. HYDE, supra note 12, at 80–81.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2016) (establishing the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence in civil forfeiture proceedings).
129. H.R. 5283, 114th Cong. (2016).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1) (2016).
131. H.R. 5283; see also House Judiciary Approves Bill, supra note 120 (The Due Process Act
“[c]reates a right to counsel for Americans in all civil asset forfeiture proceedings, [and] [p]rovides that a claimant may recover attorneys’ fees in victorious cases against a government
forfeiture.”).
132. See Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the Enactment of a Right
to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 685
(2011) (“[T]here is renewed optimism that a civil right to counsel to protect basic human needs
is indeed possible and may even be relatively close at hand.”).
133. See id. at 723 (recommending that legislative reform occur because of the “tragic stories
of individuals without lawyers during civil forfeiture proceedings”).
134. See H.R. 5283.
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with the property owner to file a claim after the government
seizes the property; the matter remains an in rem action; a
related criminal activity is not required; and there is no
collateral consequence if law enforcement abuses its power in a
forfeiture proceeding.135
Although the purpose of the bill is to address the financial
incentives embedded in civil forfeiture, the property seized
would still benefit law enforcement. The Due Process Act fails
to address this major conflict of interest and supports a system
of law enforcement policing for profits.136 The bill, however,
proposes national databases listing government-seized
property.137 Additionally, the DOJ Inspector General would
continue to audit and report on sample forfeiture actions to
Congress and the Attorney General.138 These transparent measures may help to curb law enforcement using forfeiture as a
revenue-generating mechanism. In a highly politicized Republican Congress, however, it is unlikely the bill will pass. Thus,
the courts play an increasingly important role in addressing
forfeiture abuses, like the economic incentives embedded in
civil asset forfeiture for law enforcement.
II. THE CIVIL FORFEITURE ROULETTE WHEEL
Civil forfeiture does more than allow the government to seize
a person’s property without a pre-deprivation hearing or a
corresponding criminal charge. It encourages law enforcement
to seize private property as a way to support law enforcement
budgets.139 In essence, law enforcement agencies can profit from
whatever property they can take, as proceeds from seized
property are often allocated to law enforcement activities.140
While annual financial audits confirm that forfeitures benefit
135. Id.
136. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 13 and accompanying text.
137. House Judiciary Approves Bill, supra note 120.
138. Id.
139. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 13, at 17–20.
140. O’Harrow et al., supra note 76 (“For hundreds of police departments and sheriff’s offices, the seizure proceeds accounted for 20 percent or more of their annual budgets in recent
years, according to a Post analysis.”).
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police departments’ operating budgets, no empirical data
supports law enforcement’s argument that forfeiture deters
crimes and improves public safety.141 Instead, the financial
incentives motivate law enforcement to police for profits rather
than public safety,142 often at the expense of individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights.143
Justice Thomas expressed this concern, stating, “Improperly
used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel
employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners
whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to
punish those who associate with criminals, than a component
of a system of justice.”144 Justice Thomas’s prediction has proved
true. In 2016, the DOJ reported receiving over $7.62 billion in
federal forfeiture assets and an additional $314 million from its
forfeiture adoption equitable sharing program.145
Forty states have forfeiture statutes that allow law enforcement to keep anywhere between 45% to 100% of forfeiture
proceeds.146 In 2015, the Institute for Justice, a non-profit law
firm, ranked all states’ civil asset forfeiture practices and gave
Massachusetts and North Dakota an “F” ranking, while twenty-

141. CARPENTER ET AL, supra note 21, at 7 (explaining that because federal and state data is
provided only in broad categories of spending, it is impossible to evaluate individual expenditures).
142. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 13, at 6; see 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2016) (providing the basis for
the seizure of property connected to illicit drug activity and property obtained through other
unlawful means. There are other statutes that authorize law enforcement to confiscate property).
143. CAFRA requires that an officer have probable cause to seize property. Few property
owners, however, timely challenge the forfeitures that in the majority of forfeiture cases, a judge
never reviews whether probable cause existed. Thus, in most cases, the government takes
property without presenting any evidence. Civil Asset Forfeiture, ACLU PA., https://
www.aclupa.org/issues/forfeiture/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
144. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 456 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
145. The Justice Department’s 2016 annual budget was $28.7 billion. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
SUMMARY OF BUDGET AUTHORITY BY APPROPRIATION 2 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/01/30/1_summary_of_budget_authority_
by_appr.pdf; see also AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND
AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 7 (2016),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1706.pdf.
146. Lee McGrath & Nick Sibilla, Trump Should Be Appalled by Police Asset Forfeiture, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 5, 2017, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-should-be-appalledby-police-asset-forfeiture-1488751876.
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nine other states, including Arizona, received a “D” ranking.147
These states received low grades partially because 100% of the
property law enforcement seizes through forfeiture goes to law
enforcement operations—not schools, not hospitals, not
community development.148 Public opinion reflects a high
disapproval for forfeiture proceeds going to law enforcement.149
Despite rising public opposition to civil asset forfeiture, states
are incentivized to expand forfeiture practices. For example, in
2017, Arizona senators passed Senate Bill 1142, which expanded
law enforcement’s ability to seize peaceful protesters’ personal
property to cover the costs of any property damage associated
with riots.150 Adding riots to Arizona’s Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) would have permitted
law enforcement to summarily seize protesters’ property based
on a suspicion that the property was associated with illegal
activity.151 Although the bill never made it to the House floor, it
would have been an additional weapon in Arizona’s forfeiture
statutory arsenal, which provides limited protection for
property owners and great incentives for law enforcement to
confiscate private property.152
Even though some state laws prevent law enforcement from
using forfeited assets for police operations,153 state police
departments may bypass these restrictive state laws by participating in the Justice Department’s forfeiture adoption and
equitable sharing program.154 Through the equitable sharing
147. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 22.
148. Despite its lack of statehood, the District of Columbia is included although its residents
continue to pay federal income taxes without any voting representation in Congress. See id. at
63 (discussing the District of Columbia as if it were a state and explaining the District’s reforms
that will end their participation in federal equitable sharing programs by 2018).
149. Emily Ekins, 84% of Americans Oppose Civil Asset Forfeiture, CATO INST. (Dec. 13, 2016,
1:33 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/84-americans-oppose-civil-asset-forfeiture.
150. S.B. 1142, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
151. See id.
152. Bill Status Inquiry, ARIZ. ST. LEGISLATURE, https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/
BillOverview/68892 (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
153. For a summary of state asset forfeiture statutes and distribution procedures, see
EDGEWORTH, supra note 46, at 243–51.
154. The Justice Department enters into cooperative agreements with state and local law
enforcement agencies. These agreements allow state police to seize property that falls within a
federal statute or if the state helped investigate a federal crime. ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY
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program, state police departments can seize property under
federal authority,155 transfer the property to the DOJ, and
receive up to 80% of seized assets.156
Not surprisingly, the Justice Department identifies asset
forfeiture as “a powerful tool that provides valuable resources
to state and local law enforcement that may not have otherwise
been available.”157 Significantly, the Justice Department’s
guidelines require that the money a state or local government
receives from equitable sharing go to law enforcement
purposes.158 Although the legislative purpose of the federal
adoption program is to encourage cooperation between state or
local agencies and Federal law enforcement,159 often the only
apparent cooperation involves sending assets to the Justice
Department to circumvent state due process limits or other state
forfeiture standards. The adoption program simply increases
financial incentives for states to adopt forfeiture practices and
does little to enhance federal-state cooperation in battling
crime.160 The House Judicial Committee expressed this concern
about the forfeiture adoption program during its enactment of
CAFRA.161
The Committee is concerned about two aspects
of adopted forfeiture. The first is that since
property or funds returned to state or local law
enforcement agencies through adoptive forfeiture can be kept by these entities, the process can
be used to bypass provisions of state laws or state

LAUNDERING SEC., CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 6 (2009) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T CRIM. DIV.],
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download.
155. Even police departments located in states prohibited from using state forfeiture funds
for law enforcement purposes can funnel forfeiture assets into the state police department
budget by participating in the Justice Department’s forfeiture adoption program. See id.
156. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 24–25; see also O’Harrow et al., supra note 76.
157. U.S. DEP’T CRIM. DIV., supra note 154, at 24.
158. Id. at 28.
159. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3)(B) (2016).
160. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
161. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 4 n.18 (1999).
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constitutions that dictate that property forfeited
(pursuant to state forfeiture provisions) should be
used for non-law enforcement purposes such as
elementary and primary education . . . . Second,
while the property returned through adoptive
forfeiture must be used for law enforcement
purposes, state and local governing bodies do not
exercise their normal oversight role over how the
property is used since it is not appropriated
through the normal legislative process.162
The equitable sharing program continues to receive criticism.
On January 16, 2015, former Attorney General Eric Holder
issued an order that limited the forfeiture adoption program.163
Holder’s order provided that property seized under state law
was no longer eligible for the federal adoption program unless
the property related to child pornography, firearms,
ammunition, explosives, or other public safety matters.164 If the
state agency was requesting federal adoption under the public
safety exception, the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division would have to approve the adoption.165 A
year later, however, then Attorney General Loretta Lynch
announced the Justice Department would resume its equitable
sharing program.166 Despite a change in administration, nothing
suggests Attorney General Jeff Sessions will significantly
deviate from Lynch’s Order.167 Accordingly, both federal and

162. Id.
163. The Justice Department asserted that the Order was a result of the agency’s year-long
review of its civil asset forfeiture program and its commitment to ensure its practices and
policies were consistent with “civil liberties.” Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms (referring to the testimony of Kenneth A. Blanco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, who discussed Holder’s order for the federal asset forfeiture program).
164. O’Harrow et al., supra note 76.
165. Id.
166. On March 28, 2016, then Attorney General Loretta Lynch reinstated the federal
adoption program. Christopher Ingraham, The Feds Have Resumed a Controversial Program that
Lets Cops Take Stuff and Keep It, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/28/the-feds-have-resumed-a-controversial-programthat-lets-cops-take-stuff-and-keep-it/?utm_term=.88a6cfaa6836.
167. With his recent appointment as Attorney General, Sessions supports civil asset forfei-
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state law enforcement agencies will continue to profit from
asset forfeiture.168
III. CAFRA’S DISPARATE IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
This Part examines the law through a different lens. The
controversy in every major prosecutor’s office is the racial bias
impeding equitable policing practices.169 Yet, the courts ignore
the effect these practices have on the lives and property of
African Americans and other communities of color. The DOJ’s
reports, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department170 and
Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department,171 memorialize the disparate impact law enforcement practices have on
African Americans and the financial factors that motivate law
enforcement to engage in unjustified stops and frisks.172 Those
DOJ reports illustrate the nexus between discriminatory policing and abusive revenue-generating tactics.173 They also reveal
the limited remedies for victims of police discrimination.174
A. Assessing the Fergusons
The DOJ concluded that the Ferguson Police Department
strategically targeted African Americans with stops, arrests,
ture by law enforcement. He stated “there’s ‘nothing wrong with having the money be given to
the officers who helped develop the case.’” Leef, supra note 83.
168. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Property the government seizes under CAFRA is subject to an excessiveness analysis under the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Thus, if the government prevails in a civil asset
forfeiture claim, the property the government seizes may outweigh the property owner’s profit
from the offense.
169. See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796 (2012). See generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010)
(arguing that although it is not socially acceptable to discriminate against people based on race,
society still engages in institutional racism through the criminal justice system).
170. INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON P.D., supra note 112, at 1–6.
171. INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 7.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 48 (discussing the “reasonable cause to believe that BPD engages in a pattern or
practice of discriminatory policing against African-Americans.”); INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON
P.D., supra note 110.
174. See INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON P.D., supra note 112, at 3.
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and unwarranted civil fines in violation of the Constitution and
federal law.175 The DOJ’s investigation of the Baltimore Police
Department’s (BPD) law enforcement revealed similar
systematic discriminatory practices.176 Specifically, the DOJ
noted that there were “severe and unjustified disparities in the
rates of stops, searches and arrests of African Americans.”177 In
one instance, the BPD stopped an African American man thirty
times for loitering, but never charged him with a crime.178 In
another instance, an African American man filed a complaint
stating that a police officer ordered him to exit his vehicle
during a traffic stop and searched the vehicle without the man’s
consent.179 When the search uncovered no contraband, “the
officer pulled down the man’s pants and underwear, exposing
his genitals on the side of a public street, and strip-searched
him.”180
In addition to officers depriving individuals of basic human
dignity and Fourth Amendment rights, both Ferguson and
Baltimore police departments established policing priorities
based on financial opportunities.181 In 2015, Ferguson projected
generating over $3 million in fines and fees for the city’s
operating budget, which represented 23% of its total projected
revenues.182 Although the focus of this article is on civil asset
forfeiture, Ferguson’s policing-for-profits practices—stopping
innocent pedestrians and motorists, levying fines for inchoate
charges, and using funds generated from court fines and

175. Id. at 15–41.
176. INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 47. The Baltimore investigation
appropriately considered the history of racism in the city. See id. at 12–15.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 50.
179. Id. at 34.
180. Id. Although the Fourth Amendment limits strip searches to specific, narrow circumstances following an arrest, BPD officers often violate this standard. Id.
181. Ferguson’s practice of policing for profits included over-ticketing, over-policing, high
court fines, etc. See INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON P.D., supra note 112, at 12–14; INVESTIGATION
OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 20 (“BPD’s law enforcement practices . . . exacerbate the
longstanding structural inequalities in the City by encouraging officers to have unnecessary,
adversarial interactions with community members that increase exposure to the criminal justice
system and fail to improve public safety.”).
182. INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON P.D., supra note 112, at 10.

SNOW, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 69.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

98

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 1:02 PM

[Vol. 10:69

citations to fund government operations—are analogous to the
same financial motivation that leads to forfeiture abuse.183
In Baltimore, when the officer seized cash during the abovereferenced strip search, the officer allegedly promised to return
the man’s money if he “provided information about more
serious crimes.”184 The report provided that when the
complainant did not provide this information, “the officer
arrested him and turned over only part of the confiscated
money, keeping more than $500.”185 Ferguson’s illegal searches
in violation of the Fourth Amendment are directly linked to
revenue-generating incentives.186
Although the DOJ’s findings heightened awareness of discriminatory policing in Ferguson and Baltimore, national data
support that there are many “Fergusons” throughout the
country:
•   Although Black and White Americans commit crimes at the same rate, Black suspects are
twice as likely to be arrested during a traffic
stop.187
•   Black people are 3.7 times more likely to get
arrested for drug charges, although their drug
use is no greater than any other racial group.188
•   Black people receive harsher sentences than
other races.189
•   Highway Patrol is more likely to stop black
drivers and other drivers of color than white

183. The DOJ concluded that Ferguson’s policing-for-profits practices deprive African
Americans of property ownership. It also concluded that monetary incentives lead to
corruption of a constitutional and compromised judicial system, which further undermines
trust between law enforcement and the African American community. See id. at 80–88.
184. INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 34.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 17 (“The focus on assigning blame for less-than-satisfactory numbers . . . rather
than problem-solving, is completely unproductive and weakens the collective morale of the
BPD.”).
187. GHANDNOOSH, supra note 10, at 10–16.
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at 12; Lawson, supra note 11.
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drivers.190
•   Black communities are disproportionately
over policed.191
Whether Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Trayvon Martin in Miami Gardens, Eric Garner in
Staten Island, or Sandra Bland in Prarie View, discriminatory
policing against black and brown communities is egregious,
rampant, and well-documented.192 Civil asset forfeiture is a
collateral effect of this discriminatory policing, and forfeiture’s
financial incentives encourage racial profiling in law enforcement.193
B. Turning the Other Cheek
As a result of law enforcement’s increased publicized aggression to black and brown communities, rarely do members
of these groups regard police as demonstrating characteristics
of the proverbial Officer Friendly.194 Instead, every step is taken
to avoid provoking an officer, and to escape not only an
unwarranted arrest or fine, but death.195 In Utah v. Strieff, Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent highlights this dynamic, suggesting
unlawful stops against communities of color are part of
systemic and recurring police misconduct.196 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent stated,

190. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction
on the Highway, 1010 MICH. L. REV. 651, 660 (2002).
191. The Justice Department found that 44% of Baltimore City Police Department’s stops
were in two predominantly African American areas. Yet, that area only represented 11% of
city’s population. INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 6; GHANDNOOSH, supra
note 10, at 15.
192. See Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387,
452 (2017); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 836–41 (2014); Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 75, 76–78 (2009).
193. See Devon Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 552–55 (2017).
194. Jessica Davis, From Officer Friendly to Officer Fear, BALT. SUN (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-officer-friendly-freddie-gray20150429-story.html.
195. Id.
196. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068–69 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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[F]or generations, black and brown parents have
given their children ‘the talk’—instructing them
never to run down the street; always keep your
hands where they can be seen; do not even think
of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of
how an officer with a gun will react to them.197
Despite this reality and well-documented statistics of biased
policing against African Americans, few Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims based on discriminatory policing
survive a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment,
particularly with police vehicle stops.198 Whren v. United States
clarified that under a Fourth Amendment analysis, police officers’ pretextual motive is irrelevant if officers can articulate a
valid reason for a traffic stop.199 Broken tail lights, exceeding the
speed limit, failure to come to a complete stop at a stop sign, or
simply fabricating a traffic violation have historically served as
a pretext for police to stop and search African Americans.200
Whren further legitimized the practice.201
Although a few district court cases have ruled for plaintiffs
challenging police conduct under an Equal Protection claim, the
holdings are more of a testament to the social pressure the court
experienced than a shifting standard for Equal Protection
claims.202 For example, in Floyd v. City of New York, the court
197. Id. at 2070 (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
95–136 (2010); JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); W. E.
B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903); TA NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME
(2015), MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 119–38 (2015)).
198. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–19 (1996) (holding that the officer’s
probable cause to believe the petitioners violated the traffic code rendered the stop reasonable);
Pinter v. City of New York, 976 F. Supp. 2d 539, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
199. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 2003).
200. To prevail on an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must meet the insurmountable
burden of establishing intentional racial discrimination. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976).
201. Whren distinguished an Equal Protection challenge to selective enforcement of the law
based on race from a probable cause Fourth Amendment challenge. However, the underlying
stop is often relevant to the Equal Protection claim. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
202. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Giron v. City
of Alexander, 639 F. Supp. 2d 904, 913–14 (E.D. Ark. 2010).
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
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held that the New York Police Department’s notorious stop and
frisk practice was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because the
police policy was designed to stop mostly African Americans.203
Judge Scheindlin’s order initially appeared to be a monumental
victory, but when parties sought to use the Floyd holding to
support other Equal Protection claims, courts quickly
distinguished those cases.204
Other state courts had similarly isolated victories. Giron v.
City of Alexander appeared to provide a ray of hope when it
ruled that plaintiffs met their burden with statistical evidence
that showed a police officer had disproportionally targeted
Latinos for traffic violations.205 Significantly, similar to
Ferguson,206 the City of Alexander experienced financial problems and used citations to generate revenue.207 The data supported a disparate treatment claim in discriminatory police
practices and the nexus between policing for profits.208 Similar
to Floyd, however, courts distinguished the finding of discriminatory intent in subsequent cases.209
Analogously, although the empirical data in Ferguson and
Baltimore reveal rampant racial discrimination in the arrest
patterns of African Americans, plaintiffs were unlikely to
succeed in establishing the police departments violated the

203. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
204. While the court noted the difficulty in proving such a claim, the plaintiffs presented
statistical evidence that showed Latinos were disproportionally targeted for traffic violations
by the same officer. The court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages, and also
found the officer, his supervisor, and the city liable. Id.; see Lanausse v. City of New York, No.
15 Civ. 1652 (LGS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63414, at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2016); see also Pinter
v. City of New York, 976 F. Supp. 2d 539, 555–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the officer’s
conduct in selectively policing a location where both homosexual and straight men visited was
different from selectively policing a black-dominated neighborhood). But see Betts v. Rodriquez,
No. 15-CV-3836 (JPO), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171462, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2016).
205. Giron, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
206. INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 11.
207. Giron, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
208. Id. at 929–31.
209. See McCoy v. City of Independence, No. 12-1211-JAR-JPO, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120800,
at *18–19 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding there was no Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection violation because race was one factor in the stop of plaintiff’s vehicle, but not the
only factor).
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Equal Protection Clause.210 Constitutional law scholars, civil
rights experts, and criminal defense attorneys will attest to the
hopelessness of challenging discriminatory police practices
either under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or as a selective-prosecution defense.211 The
standard to establish discriminatory intent is so preposterously
high that anecdotes, statistical research, and glaring disparity of
racial profiling seem meaningless.212 Thus, establishing that law
enforcement actions were motivated by discriminatory intent
regularly fails unless there is a “smoking gun” statement from
a law enforcement agent admitting to intentionally
discriminating against a protected class.213
While community survival norms may require passive response to police actions, judicial standards similarly accept
discriminatory policing practices. The driving question is why
does the Supreme Court maintain and uphold civil asset
forfeiture and other discriminatory practices as constitutional
when societal realities contradict those conclusions?
IV. CREATING RECIPROCAL CHANGE
Looking to the courts for resolution of social justice issues has
always been a slow process, and change in the law has rarely
happened in isolation.214 Furthermore, divesting property
210. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996). Courts have refused to
deem the process a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause or the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court also refuses to deem a statute with a
disparate impact on communities of color a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause for many of the reasons previously cited. Id.
211. Darby & Levy, supra note 192, at 463–68; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually
Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 23–33 (2014).
212. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456. The Armstrong Court favored prosecutorial discretion
and the Court established such a high legal standard that made it impossible for most plaintiffs to meet the unrealistic burden. Contra Griggs v. Dukes Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434–35
(1971); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
213. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239–40 (1976).
214. See Faith Rivers James, Leadership Roundtable Article, Leadership and Social Justice
Lawyering, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 977–80 (2012); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW, TOWARD A MORE JUST JUSTICE SYSTEM: HOW OPEN ARE THE COURTS TO SOCIAL
JUSTICE LITIGATION? 61 (2016).
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ownership from African Americans, Native Americans, and
low-income communities is deeply embedded in the laws and
the formation of this country.215 The inequitable implementation of civil asset forfeiture further perpetuates this
legacy and exacerbates a history of property deprivation in the
African American community. While the double tripartite
system of government is designed to create checks and balances
that ensure a just and humane society, rarely does that ideal
meet reality—particularly for low-income African American
communities.216 When the Supreme Court and all other
branches of government fail to create that system of fairness,
social activism serves as an important check for legal
disparities.217
A. Using Movements to Change the Rule of Law
Notwithstanding Constitutional Amendments, the Supreme
Court has frequently proven to be an unfavorable forum for
issues pertaining to communities of color.218 Despite the varying

215. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 435–41 (2015). See
generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, COLOR OF LAW (2017) (suggesting that the Fair Housing Act of
1968 prohibited future discrimination, but did nothing to reverse residential discrimination
patterns that had become deeply embedded).
216. See Victor Suthammanont, Note, Judicial Notice: How Judicial Bias Impacts the Unequal
Application of Equal Protection Principles in Affirmative Action Cases, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1173,
1177–90 (2005) (tracing racism in the courts and societal poverty, employment, policing,
education, etc. from the Civil War to present). See generally Swati Prakash, Racial Dimensions of
Property Value Protection Under the Fair Housing Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2013)
(discussing how “courts underprotect low-income and minority families from property value
depreciation and displacement”); Kelly J. Varsho, In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying
the Highest Price for Judicial Independence?, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 454–56 (2007) (describing the
accountability and diversity of the judiciary and how it affects public confidence in the courts).
217. See COLE, supra note 25, at 225–27. Quite frequently, media, political action committees,
lobbyist, and other special interest groups use their power to amplify and frame an issue.
Elected officials concerned with tracking constituents’ views for reelection purposes often mold
their policies to align with these constituents’ demands. Social justice movements serve a similar
function in the courts. See Developments in the Law—International Environmental Law, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1580, 1589 (1991) (arguing intergovernmental organizations’ “decision making is . . .
influenced by media reports of public opinion polls, scientific studies, and criticisms made by”
international non-governmental organizations).
218. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II constitutional); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding racial segregation as constitutional); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)
(holding African Americans were not U.S. citizens regardless of their status as free or as a slave).
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perspectives and limited empirical data to measure the direct
correlation between judicial review and protest movements,
most scholars agree that public opinion influences courts.219
Public opinion, as framed through protest movements,
provides context to legal problems and has historically given
courts a barometer of popular views—minimizing judicial
backlash.220 By humanizing a problem in ways lawyers often
cannot in a judicial setting, these movements connect
supporters, tap into moral obligations, increase public scrutiny
of an issue, and may encourage Supreme Court review.221
Whether it be judicial activism or the Court protecting its
implicit legitimacy, there exists a legacy of cases where the
union of public opinion and Supreme Court review are
increasingly apparent.222 Most recently, Obergefell v. Hodges223
exemplified how a social justice movement prepared the Court
for a favorable decision.224 Although this Article will not explore
the LGBTQIA movement that led to Obergefell, the decision has
proven to result in less judicial backlash than landmark
219. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of
Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2781–82 (2014) (illustrating how the Montgomery
Bus Boycott story began with a social movement and influenced the courts); Tomiko BrownNagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: the Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1436, 1438 (2005) (quoting Robert Post when he states “that the ‘beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors’ heavily influenced the Court’s result in Grutter”); Robert C. Post, Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law
both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”).
220. See COLE, supra note 25, at 12–13.
221. Id. at 72–73; see also Ruth Payne, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, and the Path to Social
Reform: One Movement’s Struggle for Coherency in the Quest for Change, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
587, 627 n.220 (2002).
222. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (“[C]hanged understandings
of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent
to new generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are
considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”).
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2010) (explaining public interest organization’s role and influence on
policy reform); Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory
Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 449,
461 (2014) (“Sustained by incremental changes in public opinion, state courts and legislatures
began to recognize same-sex marriage, in turn further energizing movement supporters and
motivating opponents.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation
Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 311–12 (2013).
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decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.
Some argue that Obergefell did not face the same level of
resistance because the Supreme Court’s ruling aligned with
public discourse on the issue of same-sex marriage.225 The
Obergefell trajectory was unlike Brown v. Board of Education and
Roe v. Wade, where massive backlash included blatant defiance
of the Supreme Court’s orders.226
1.

Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights movement

At the time of the Brown decision, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal
Defense and Educational Fund had more Supreme Court
victories than any other organization.227 Under Thurgood
Marshall’s leadership, the organization’s legal strategy was to
develop state cases and use them to challenge the Plessy v.
Ferguson228 “separate but equal” paradigm.229 The Legal Defense
Fund (LDF) also used the courts as a mechanism to educate and
mold public opinion on social equity issues such as racially
restrictive covenants.230
With Shelley v. Kraemer, as part of companion cases, the
NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund strategized to remove restrictive covenants that prohibited African Americans from living in
white neighborhoods.231 As the LDF launched its legal strategy,
its plan was butressed by a Chicago Commission on Race
Relations’ report dispelling myths concerning the harms of
integration and the “negro.”232 While oppositional segregation-

225. COLE, supra note 25, at 93.
226. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown
v. Board of Education and its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1497 (2006) (describing
incidents of resistance to the decision).
227. Clement E. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 101, 102
(1955).
228. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896).
229. Vose, supra note 227 (describing NAACP’s strategy).
230. Id. at 111.
231. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The case was technically not a NAACP case,
but the organization worked with George Vaughn to coordinate arguments before the Supreme
Court. See Vose, supra note 227, at 129.
232. Vose, supra note 227, at 114–16.
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ists knew morality may not have been on their side at the time,
there nonetheless existed a body of law in the courts that was.233
Ironically, the courts, which lawyers so heavily rely upon to
render unbiased decisions, were the favored forums by those
segregationists striving to maintain status quo. Nonetheless, the
LDF mobilized through the courts and effectively used the
Supreme Court as a platform for racial reform.234 While Shelly v.
Kraemer deemed racially restrictive covenants unenforceable,
the holding proved ineffective in desegregating housing and
increasing opportunities for African Americans, Jewish
Americans, and Asian Americans to purchase property in white
neighborhoods.235 One possible explanation for the hostile
response was that the LDF effectively mobilized the Court, but
did not effectively mobilize widespread public support—
particularly with white segregationists.236
A similar challenge developed with Brown v. Board of
Education.237 Despite the Brown mandate, states refused to
desegregate schools.238 President Eisenhower rejected the Brown
decision, and callously failed to enforce the law when Arkansas
Governor Faubus ordered the National Guard to block African
American students from entering a white high school.239
Eventually, the Little Rock Nine courageously entered Little
Rock’s Central High School and began their classes in the midst
of government-sanctioned violence.240 With Brown, the LDF
may have won the battle for school desegregation, but it lost the

233. Id. at 111.
234. Id. at 110.
235. See Abigail Perkis, Shelly v. Kraemer: Legal Reform for America’s Neighborhoods, NAT’L
CONST. CTR. (May 9, 2014), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/shelley-v-kraemer-legalreform-for-americas-neighborhoods.
236. See id. (discussing the public’s efforts to undermine the implementation of Shelly v.
Kraemer).
237. Brown at 60: The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, LEGAL DEF.
FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/brown-at-60-southern-manifesto-and-massive-resistancebrown (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Brown at 60].
238. Id.
239. Integration of Central High School, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/blackhistory/central-high-school-integration (last visited Dec. 6, 2017).
240. Johanna Miller Lewis, History of the Alternative Desegregation Plan and the Black
Community’s Perspective and Reaction, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 363, 363 (2008).
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war for education equity.241 It appeared as though the Brown
decision was a mere piece of paper.
Social reform, however, does not end with one judicial
victory. Instead, a legal shift is often a springboard for
continued social activism. A lesson from Brown was the impact
inequality has on children’s self-esteem and that segregation
demoralizes human dignity.242 This message resonated with
courts in other civil rights actions and the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC).243
With little faith in the judicial process, the SNCC and Dr.
King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) used
direct action as a foundation for change to restore human dignity to African Americans.244 The SNCC built its protest movement on sit-ins that did not always align with the national civil
rights litigation strategy.245 Despite this conflict, the SNCC
continued its sit-ins challenging Jim Crow laws and voter suppression—pushing for an inclusive political system and
economic empowerment.246 The LDF also moved forward challenging the delayed implementation of Brown, demanding full
citizenship for the descendants of slaves who fought in a
segregated army and who built many of the courthouses that
rendered civil rights decisions.247 The LDF continued to use the
Constitution as the foundation to destroy Jim Crow legislation.248
Unpredictably, the SNCC sit-ins and SCLC protests were
equally impactful as the LDF litigation initiatives on societal

241. Brown at 60, supra note 237.
242. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Does Protest Work?, 56 HOW. L.J. 721, 734–36 (2013) [hereinafter
Does Protest Work?].
243. Id.
244. Leonard S. Rubinowitz et al., A ‘Notorious Litigant’ and ‘Frequenter of Jails’: Martin Luther
King, Jr., His Lawyers, and the Legal System, 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 494, 572 (2016).
245. Does Protest Work?, supra note 242, at 734–35; see Francesca Polletta, The Structural
Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV.
367, 396 (2000).
246. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 YALE L.J. 2698, 2711
(2014) [hereinafter Civil Rights Canon].
247. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 368–70 (1999).
248. Civil Rights Canon, supra note 246, at 2707.
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reform, if not more so.249 The lunch counter sit-ins and subsequent freedom rides increased public awareness and support
for America’s greatest shame—racism and related mob violence250—culminating into the Ku Klux Klan’s murder of Freedom Summer activists: James Earl Chaney, Andrew Goodman,
and Michael Schwerner.251
The LDF used its resources for change in the courts rather
than street-protest movements as the SNCC and civil rights
leaders used.252 More by chance than choice, however, the LDF’s
legal strategy was bolstered by the social and political
momentum non-lawyers created.253 Just as the courts had
become a forum to educate about the problem of racially
restrictive covenants and shift public attitudes about
segregation, the SNCC’s and the SCLC’s protests carved out
opportunities for receptive courts to hear cases on racially
segregated public accommodations.254 This alignment is important because the Court relies on general public acceptance as
a tool to combat widespread resistance to its decisions.255 It is an
alignment that strengthened civil rights litigation and moved
the Court to overturn “separate but equal.”256
2.

Roe v. Wade and the women’s movement

Roe v. Wade presented a more complicated model.257 Scholars
have extensively explored the social movement that led to Roe
v. Wade and continue to explore the anti-abortion activists’
attempts to erode the decision.258 An important aspect of the
249. Id. at 2711.
250. Murder in Mississippi, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/
features/freedomsummer-murder/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017).
251. Id.
252. Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 952 (2010).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 980.
255. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 717 (1994).
256. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
257. See 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
258. See generally Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making
of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 460 (2014) (discussing “how the business
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analysis is assessing the National Organization for Women
(NOW) and other gender equity organizations’ ability to
mobilize public support and prompt the Court to legalize
abortion.259 Particularly noteworthy is how the protest movement framed the abortion issue and the reciprocal influence
these protests had on the Court, as well as, the influence the
Court had on the movement.
The women’s movement strived for legalized abortion as an
issue of full dignity, self-determination, gender equality, and an
attempt to end coerced motherhood.260 As the movement held
protests throughout the nation, the Court seemed to understand the public sentiment about legal abortion but ignored
the equity platforms that NOW and other organizations
promoted.261 Instead, the Court arrived at its decision through
the medical lens of a woman’s right to privacy, which was the
same approach that peculated in various state courts.262 Because
of the Court’s privacy lens reasoning, many argue that the Roe
holding failed to address the true problem—a woman’s lack of
agency over her body and life.263 Despite this shortcoming, the
overwhelming impetus of the women’s movement influenced
the Court in upholding a woman’s right to terminate a
lobby mobilized against pregnancy discrimination claims”); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B.
Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2073
(2011) (discussing the “backlash narrative” that resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Roe v. Wade); Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 898 (2014)
(discussing the social movement around Roe v. Wade); Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Constitutional Right (Not) to Procreate, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1272–73 (2014) (noting how “consultation
laws forced anti-abortion activists to flesh out the supposed connections between Roe v. Wade
and family law”); Bonny E. Sweeney, Note, Bering v. Share: Accommodating Abortion and the First
Amendment, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 698, 704–05 (1987) (discussing the impact of anti-abortion
protests).
259. To illustrate, the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project was an important gender equity
organization. See, e.g., Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (last visited
Oct. 3, 2017). Under Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s direction, ACLU litigated various gender inequality
issues, often challenging social constructs about gender. Id.
260. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Root: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1875, 1880–86 (2010) (describing the women’s movement’s participation in legislative
hearing protests, public speak-outs, and speeches).
261. See id. at 1880.
262. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
263. See Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on
Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 419, 439 (1995).
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pregnancy.
Subsequent to the Roe decision, anti-abortion activists gained
momentum, and the Court experienced increased pressure to
overturn Roe.264 This backlash and the Court’s resistance to
adopt an Equal Protection analysis forced the women’s
movement to reframe the abortion issue.265 Rather than
promoting equal protection, protest movements were simply
trying to ensure that the Court reaffirmed the Roe holding.266
In various decisions since Roe, the Court has upheld
regulatory barriers to a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy.267 For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Roe,
but also increased states’ authority to regulate various aspects
of abortion, including mandatory counseling before a woman
terminates a pregnancy.268
Both sides felt Casey was a defeat.269 The Court appeared to
acknowledge not only the strong women’s movement leading
to legalized abortions, but also the growing counter-majority
protests.270 The Casey Court expressed concern with its legitimacy, providing: “The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself
in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine
what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”271 Predictably, the abortion battle remains challenging
264. See id. at 450.
265. Id. at 439–45.
266. See id.
267. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989); Planned Parenthood Ass’n
of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983).
268. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). The decision may
have upheld a women’s right to an abortion, but it tempered that choice by increasing barriers
and treating women as if they are unable to make an informed decision. Id.
269. Jacque Wilson, Before and After Roe v. Wade, CNN (Jan. 22, 2013, 11:44 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/health/roe-wade-abortion-timeline/index.html
(“Supporters on either side of the abortion issue [were] left confused after the Supreme Court
rule[d] on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey.”).
270. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861 (“In a less significant case, stare decisis analysis . . . would[]
stop at the point we have reached. But the sustained and widespread debate Roe has provoked
calls for some comparison between that case and others of comparable dimension that have
responded to national controversies . . . .”).
271. Id. at 865.
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due to the strong counter protests and the ambiguity in what
may be the “will of the people.”272
B. Legitimacy Theory
Professor Barry Friedman’s noteworthy book, The Will of the
People, explores the correlation between normative values and
the Supreme Court.273 Significantly, Friedman notes the question is not whether the Court is influenced by public opinion,
but how the Court is influenced and by who.274 Essential to
Professor Friedman’s theory and the legitimacy equation is
recognizing that the law remains a human experience, and the
Justices are not immune from desiring the public to perceive
their decisions as fair.275 This alignment helps reduce judicial
backlash and resistance to the Court’s orders, as witnessed in
Brown and, to a lesser extent, Roe.
Undoubtedly, assessing constitutional change through the
lens of public opinion raises questions about judicial activism
and the role of precedent.276 Such a simplified explanation,
however, overlooks that within the context of judicial review—
the Supreme Court has both implicit and explicit legitimacy.277
272. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (Abby Kagan ed., 1st ed. 2010)
(writing how the “will of the people” and public opinion have shaped controversial Supreme
Court’s decisions, such as those on abortion); Gene Johnson, Anti-Abortion
Activists, CounterProtesters Rally Around US, AP NEWS (Feb. 11, 2017), https://apnews.com/
e2110198d4804dbca6b629da0ffff631/anti-abortion-activists-counter-protesters-rally-around-us
(“‘I personally believe that abortion is a profound injustice to the human race,’ [a counterprotestor] said.”).
273. FRIEDMAN, supra note 272, at 14–18.
274. Id. at 378. Friedman extensively explores various forms of judicial activism from both
conservatives and liberals, while documenting the battle between originalism and those who
advocate for a living constitution approach. Id. at 301–03.
275. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural
Justice, 123 Y ALE L.J.F. 525, 537–39 (2014) (acknowledging the interplay between fairness and
the Court’s legitimacy). Justice Sotomayor has been cited as being particularly concerned with
the fairness of the Court’s decisions. Id. She has also referenced her concern that police action is
deemed fair. Id.
276. See generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980) (examining the role precedent and public values play in constitutional
interpretation).
277. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Although many state judges are elected, expectations are
that the judges will render unbiased decisions, and not be swayed by how the decision will
impact their reelection. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 759 (Guenther Roth & Claus
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The Court’s implicit legitimacy is based upon the Justices’ legal
expertise and the rational decisions they render,278 while its
explicit legitimacy is based on its authority as enumerated in
the Constitution.279 When the Court’s legal expertise fails to
align with mainstream norms, both its explicit and implicit
legitimacy are questioned.280 This effect does not suggest the
Justices are trying each case in the proverbial court of public
opinion. Instead, through time, judicial review should reflect
the values of the people.281
According to the principles of legitimacy theory, when an
authority drastically deviates from the psychological expectations of the status quo, its legitimacy diminishes.282 Congress
frequently voices concerns regarding judicial appointments.
While congressional Republicans often fear that Democratic
judicial nominees will employ judicial activism, congressional
Democrats fear Republican judicial nominees will undermine
constitutional progress and erode civil rights; however, neither

Wittich eds., 2d ed. 1968); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
WIS. L. REV. 379, 383 (1983). See generally, Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness
and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 211 (2012) (“examin[ing] the shared aims and overlaps in operation and effect of
these two criminal justice dynamics―the ‘legitimacy’ that derives from fair adjudication and
professional enforcement and the ‘moral credibility’ that derives from just results―as well as
the occasional potential for conflict”).
278. Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Sources of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 155
(2013) [hereinafter New Sources of Legitimacy]. Although many state judges are elected,
expectations are that the judges will render unbiased decisions, and not be swayed by how the
decision will impact their reelection. See WEBER, supra note 277; Hyde, supra note 277, at 382.
279. New Sources of Legitimacy, supra note 278, at 155; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
280. Tom Tyler’s legitimacy theory supports that when a court’s decision overwhelmingly
usurps what appears just and the decision leads to absurd results, the court’s legitimacy is
questioned. See Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and Distributive
Justice in Organizational Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 177 (1987); Bowers & Robinson, supra note
277, at 223; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Symposium, Procedural Justice and the
Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6–7
(2011); Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 240–41 (2011); New
Sources of Legitimacy, supra note 278, at 154.
281. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 272, at 18 (“Perhaps most important, in some of the most
crucial moments in the struggle over judicial review there was an extraordinary engagement of
the American people.”).
282. See id. at 248; Alexander & Ruderman, supra note 280, at 177; Bowers & Robinson, supra
note 277, at 223; Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 280; Jojanneke van der Toorn et al., A
Sense of Powerlessness Fosters System Justification: Implications for the Legitimation of Authority,
Hierarchy, and Government, 36 POL. PSYCHOL. 93, 94 (2014).
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sentiment is totally accurate.283 Instead, Justices’ decisions are
increasingly more influenced by public opinion than the
political views of the President who appointed the Justice or the
Senators involved in the confirmation.284
Bush v. Gore exemplifies the dynamic between judicial review
and legitimacy.285 Precedent may have guided the Court’s per
curiam decision, but the Court would seemingly disregard
public sentiment concerning the Florida voter count in what
appeared to be an explicit abuse of political power to influence
an election.286 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens wrote,
“Although we may never know with complete certainty the
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of
law.”287 Justice Stevens’s dissent, which Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer joined, reflects the Court’s effort to maintain its
implicit legitimacy, as measured in part, by public opinion.
Post Brown, segregationists challenged the Court’s legitimacy in rendering a decision that was not grounded in
precedent.288 Despite the cries of judicial activism surrounding
Brown, Justices professed to rely on their legal expertise and
precedent.289 The Court, however, noted it “must consider
283. Supreme Court Gallup Poll, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supremecourt.aspx%E2%80%8B (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (showing survey results for a list of questions
about the public’s opinions of potential nominees).
284. Id.; see also Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the
Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89, 109
(2005).
285. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (holding it was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause to use different voter tabulation mechanisms in different Florida counties).
286. Id. at 156–58.
287. Id. at 128–29.
288. Although various extremist groups may resist the Court’s decisions, it is the widespread dissent that tends to threaten the Court’s legitimacy. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra
note 280, at 728; see also Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Judicial Activism Arguments, the
Abortion Debate, and the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201, 208 (2013)
[hereinafter The Abortion Debate].
289. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court cited to six cases involving the “separate but
equal” public education cases: Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong
Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v.
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), but distinguished those cases from Brown because the tangible
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public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation.”290 Further, during the Brown oral arguments, Justice Frankfurter
questioned John W. Davis, counsel for South Carolina in Briggs
v. Elliott, about whether social conditions affect how the Court
should interpret equal protection.291 Davis replied that “what is
unequal today may be equal tomorrow, or vice versa.”292
Davis’s response ultimately opened the door for the Court to
overrule Plessey v. Ferguson and inferred that precedent is
applied in context.293
A similar sentiment continues with the Court’s treatment of
abortion. During Chief Justice Roberts’s Senate confirmation
hearing, Senator Arlen Specter questioned him on his position
concerning the jurisprudence in Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.294 Although
Chief Justice Roberts would not respond directly to his position on Roe or Casey, he indicated that an assessment of precedent involves a number of factors including settled expectation
and whether the precedent is unworkable.295 Despite Chief
Justice Roberts’s reluctance to deviate from precedent, he
prudently acknowledged the importance of the Court’s
legitimacy, both as an adherent to precedent and an examiner
of whether precedent is workable.296

factors discussed in those six cases were not the sole issue expressed in Brown. Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 392–93 (1954).
290. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93.
291. IRONS, supra note 247, at 392.
292. Id.
293. See New Sources of Legitimacy, supra note 278, at 154 (explaining in the context of Brown
how social science and public support can overcome legal precedent).
294. See Edward M. Kennedy Inst. for the U.S. Senate, John Roberts: Supreme Court Nomination
Hearings from PBS, NewsHour, and EMK Institute, YOUTUBE (Jun. 25, 2010), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNF_pwkP6gg.
295. Id.
296. Chief Justice Roberts further indicated:
[I]t is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent. Precedent
plays an important role in promoting stability and evenhandedness. It is
not enough, and the Court has emphasized this on several occasions . . .
that you may think the prior decision was wrongly decided. It does not
answer the question; it just poses the question. You do look at these other
factors: like settled expectations, like the legitimacy of the Court, like
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Pro-life activists continue to question the role of judicial
activism in Roe because the Court’s decision seemingly had
little grounding in precedent.297 Significantly, the Roe Court
noted that a decision that denied a woman’s right to an abortion would come “at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy . . . .”298
Justice Thomas expressed a similar concern in his dissent in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.299 He assailed his colleagues for their liberal judicial activism on the issue of abortion
and suggested that the Court’s constitutional standards shift
depending on the decision the Court seeks to render.300 In
addressing the appropriate tiers of scrutiny for the abortion
analysis and the resulting judicially created rights, he wrote,
“[T]hese labels now mean little . . . . The Court should abandon
the pretense that anything other than policy preferences
underlies its balancing of constitutional rights and interests in
any given case.”301 Justice Thomas’s concern reinforces the
argument that judicial standards are more malleable than the
Justices may acknowledge. It again questions which legitimacy
factors may lead Justices to change existing precedent.
In the area of civil asset forfeiture, the Court’s review of the
issue has become wedded to precedent without considering
whether the forfeiture principles embedded in the laws of
deodands are still workable in contemporary society.302 Addiwhether a particular precedent is workable or not, whether a precedent has
been eroded by subsequent developments. All of those factors go into the
determination of whether to revisit a precedent under the principles of
stare decisis.
Edward M. Kennedy Inst. for the U.S. Senate, supra note 294.
297. See The Abortion Debate, supra note 288, at 220 (explaining that many anti-abortion
groups attack Roe as being a demonstration of the Court’s judicial activism with no basis in the
Constitution).
298. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
299. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
300. Id. (“I write separately to emphasize how today’s decision perpetuates the Court’s habit
of applying different rules to different constitutional rights—especially the putative right to
abortion.”).
301. Id. at 2328 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
302. Berman, supra note 42, at 3 (“[B]y simply invoking historical precedent as a talismanic
answer to today’s riddles, the Court fails to provide any analysis of how the precedent might
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tionally, criminal justice practices increasingly suggest that civil
forfeiture procedures have become ethically illegitimate.
Legitimacy theory supports that community disappointment
and disillusionment with court decisions incite civil disobedience and protest movements.303 The next section explores this
interplay by demonstrating how Black Lives Matter can
influence the Supreme Court to ensure the Court maintains its
legitimacy in the area of civil asset forfeiture.
V. BLACK LIVES MATTER: ERODING CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
Protracted litigation lowers community approval of the judicial process. But it is the historical interplay between protest
movements and judicial review that creates a platform for
movements, such as Black Lives Matter, to influence the Court’s
interpretation of civil asset forfeiture. Whether through an
enhanced Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines or Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause analysis, the goal should be to
instill protections for low-income communities and
communities of color. Black Lives Matter is poised to create this
reciprocal change to enhance the Court’s diminished
legitimacy.
Undoubtedly, the Black Lives Matter movement grew
exponentially and garnered significant impact and influence.304
Through social media, millions of people learned about a social
injustice, mobilized, and demanded government accountability.305 The social justice outrage resulted in protest in various
factions of the community: activists, students, and community
groups took to the streets protesting the grand jury findings of
no probable cause to indict Ferguson police officer Darren
be justified.”).
303. See generally Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil
Disobedience, 18 GA. L. REV. 929, 930–31 (1984) (explaining Socrates defiance of the law of Athens
and how this relates to current legal obligations when society as a whole disagrees with newly
enacted legislation, court decisions, acts of war, and other societal interests).
304. Between 2014 and 2015, over 29 million tweets were recorded for four Black Lives
Matter events. See Anealla Safdar, Black Lives Matter: The Social Media Behind a Movement, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/black-lives-matter-socialmedia-movement-160803042719539.html.
305. Id.
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Wilson306 or NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo.307 Massive
demonstrations stopped traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge.308
Protesters prevented shopping in Minnesota’s Mall of America
and held die-ins in front of some of the stores.309 Harvard Law
students protested in the streets of Cambridge and Boston
demanding that their Dean affirm that black lives matter, and
students from other law schools participated in similar
protests.310
These protests heightened awareness of police brutality
against black and brown lives. In the executive branch, the
Department of Justice investigations and subsequent reports
found that police practices in both Ferguson and Baltimore
showed a pattern of discriminatory policing.311 Those reports
were largely sparked by the Black Lives Matter movement.312 In
direct response to heightened awareness of discriminatory
policing, the Justice Department investigated and entered into
consent decrees with the cities of Baltimore, Maryland, and
Ferguson, Missouri.313 In assessing the African Americans’ trust
of Ferguson law enforcement, the Justice Department explicitly
306. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darrenwilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html?mcubz=0.
307. Dana Ford, Greg Botelho & Ben Brumfield, Protests Erupt in Wake of Chokehold Death
Decision, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/justice/new-york-grandjury-chokehold/index.html.
308. Ashley Southall & C.J. Hughes, Dozens Arrested During Brooklyn Bridge Protest Against
Police Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/nyregion/
protesters-arrested-as-brooklyn-bridge-is-snarled.html?mcubz=0.
309. Chanting ‘Black Lives Matter,’ Protesters Shut Down Part of Mall of America, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/us/chanting-black-lives-matterprotesters-shut-down-part-of-mall-of-america.html [hereinafter Chanting Black Lives Matter].
310. Law students across the country were taking action, including Harvard Law students
who used their Harvard privilege to bring about justice. Letter to Dean Minow and Harvard Law
School Administration, COAL. HARV. L. SCH. (Dec. 8, 2014), https://harvardlawcoalition.
wordpress.com/.
311. INVESTIGATION OF BALTIMORE P.D., supra note 12, at 47; INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON
P.D., supra note 112, at 70.
312. See generally J. CHRISTIAN ADAMS, INJUSTICE: EXPOSING THE RACIAL AGENDA OF THE
OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (2011) (arguing that under the Obama administration, the DOJ
implemented a bias agenda addressing racial disparities by filling the Civil Rights Division with
“liberal activist groups”).
313. See Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial Arts
Training, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 146 n.12 (2016).
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references the Michael Brown shooting.314 The visibility of the
Justice Department’s increased scrutiny of these cities has led
other municipalities to reassess the direct consequences of overpolicing black communities—including practices that implicate
civil asset forfeiture.315 The Department of Justice also
temporarily amended its equitable sharing program.316
On the legislative front, Campaign Zero, a strategy developed out of the Black Lives Matter movement, reports that
various reforms have occurred through its activism.317 The reforms are considered both practical, and perhaps, a bit less
radical than many had expected. 318 Campaign Zero reports
that:
•   At least 101 laws have been enacted in the past
three years to address police violence.
•   New legislation has been enacted in 40 states
since 2014.
•   Ten states (CA, CO, CT, IL, LA, MD, OR, UT,
TX, WA) have enacted legislation addressing
three or more Campaign Zero policy categories.
•   At least forty bills are currently being considered in [six] states to address police violence.
•   Executive action has been taken at the federal
level as well as legislation.
•   Local ordinances have been passed in many of
314. To demonstrate the history of discriminatory police practices, the Justice Department
indicates the trust between African Americans and Ferguson law enforcement was damaged
“long before Michael Brown’s shooting death in August 2014.” INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON
P.D., supra note 112, at 79.
315. O’Harrow et al., supra note 76.
316. Id.
317. See Track Progress of Legislation, Federal, State, and Local Legislation Addressing Police
Violence, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/#action (last visited Dec. 7,
2017) [hereinafter Track Progress of Legislation]. Campaign Zero is described as “an agenda to
resist President Trump and end police violence.” Id.
318. Radley Balko, Opinion, The Black Lives Matter Policy Agenda is Practical, Thoughtful—and
Urgent, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2015/08/25/the-black-lives-matter-policy-agenda-is-practical-thoughtful-andurgent/?utm_term=.bc72f7bc169b.
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America’s largest cities.319
Much of the original civil unrest that Black Lives Matter
sparked, however, was in response to the judicial branch
upholding discriminatory practices. The movement demanded
increased police accountability, but it appears the courts
continue to legitimize racism under various constitutional
provisions.320 Judges deny suppression motions and give
inadequate jury instructions that increasingly protect law enforcement.321 Grand juries fail to find probable cause to indict
police officers.322 Characterization of black men being violent
and dangerous are perpetuated in each court proceeding and
courts appear to uphold laws that were created to maintain
racial status quo.323 Ironically, the judicial process continues to
exonerate police officers, but each courtroom defeat leads to
increased public awareness of discriminatory policing and the
judicial system’s complacency with the problem.324
Leaders of the Black Lives Matter movement continue to
express their disappointment and frustration with the unfavorable outcomes in cases involving law enforcement abuse
of power.325Additional frustration stems from an overall lack of
lawyers and judicial involvement within the movement itself.326
319. Track Progress of Legislation, supra note 317.
320. See Josephine Ross, Cops on Trial: Did Fourth Amendment Case Law Help George
Zimmerman’s Claim of Self-Defense?, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2016).
321. Id. at 38–43 (discussing that during the George Zimmerman trial, the jury never
received instructions that the initial aggressor must use all reasonable means to retreat before
using deadly force).
322. Chapter Four: Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1803–05 (2015).
323. See GHANDNOOSH, supra note 10, at 15–18; see also Nick Wing, When the Media Treats
White Suspects and Killers Better than Black Victims, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2017), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/when-the-media-treats-white-suspects-and-killers-betterthan-black-victims_us_59c14adbe4b0f22c4a8cf212.
324. Carl Bialik, Police Killings Almost Never Lead to Murder Charges, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May
1, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/baltimore-police-officers-charged-freddiegray/; see The Problem, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/problem/ (last
visited Dec. 8, 2017).
325. The Latest: Black Groups in Cincinnati Upset by 2nd Mistrial, U.S. NEWS (June 23, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ohio/articles/2017-06-23/the-latest-day-5-ofjury-deliberations-in-ex-cop-trial.
326. See Purvi Shah et al., Radtalks: What Could Be Possible if the Law Really Stood for Black
Lives?, 19 CUNY L. REV. 91, 94–95 (2015); Nyasha Laing, The Role of an Activist Attorneys in
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With little support from the legal community, Black Lives
Matter seeks other means of initiating community involvement
to hold law enforcement and courts accountable.327 One method
is promoting resistance strategies, addressing both the direct
and indirect consequences of law enforcement’s abuse of power
and the courts’ inability to achieve justice.328
We have been here before. During the civil rights movement,
the SNCC educated people about sit-ins, picketing, and strikes
because progress in the courts was too slow and yielded
disappointing results.329 The LDF’s work with Dr. King’s SCLC
led to favorable judicial decisions, executive enforcement of
those decisions, and eventually legislative reform.330 Similarly,
the SNCC’s resistance coupled with litigation led to economic
empowerment.331
Similar to the SNCC and SCLC, Black Lives Matter has
renewed attention to discriminatory practices against African
Americans and has developed strategies to address the
discrimination.332 For example, Campaign Zero identifies ten
policy solutions to protect the lives and property of black and
brown communities.333 One solution includes ending for-profit
policing.334 The campaign identifies several key strategies to
meet this goal:
•   End police department quotas for tickets and
arrests;
•   Limit fines and fees for low-income people;

#BlackLivesMatter Movement, YES! MAG. (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/
life-after-oil/the-role-of-an-activist-attorney-in-the-blacklivesmatter-movement-20160223.
327. See Community Oversight, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/
oversight (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
328. See, e.g., Chanting Black Lives Matter, supra note 309; Solutions, CAMPAIGN ZERO,
https://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
329. Does Protest Work?, supra note 242, at 735–36.
330. Id. at 729.
331. Id. at 735.
332. About the Black Lives Matter Network, supra note 2.
333. We Can End Police Violence in America, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://
www.joincampaignzero.org/#vision (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
334. Id.
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•   Prevent police from taking the money or
property of innocent people;
•   Require police departments to bear the cost of
misconduct;
•   Require the cost of misconduct settlements to
be paid out of the police department budget
instead of the City’s general fund;
•   Restrict police departments from receiving
more money from the general fund when they
go over-budget on lawsuit payments.335
The Black Lives Matter movement’s role was critical in the
first step of increasing the visibility of police abuse of power.
The movement also created an awareness of for-profit policing
and discriminatory policing—a problem that likely would have
been ignored without the protest movement.336
Another strategy for the Black Lives Matter movement to
consider is building unlikely allies. Although discriminatory
policing adversely impacts communities of color, conservatives and billionaire businessmen, such as the Koch brothers,
are supporting criminal justice reform, including reducing mass
incarceration resulting from the war on drugs.337
Barry Friedman’s question of who most influences the Court
remains an open question.338 Although there is no empirical
data to answer this question, Justices indifferent to public
opinion may actually have a particular subset of the general
public that influences their decisions.339 The enactment of
CAFRA required an unusual bipartisan partnership, including
the support of then Senator Jeff Sessions and Representative
335. End For-Profit Policing, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/endpolicing-for-profit (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
336. See generally COLE, supra note 25, at 204–08 (discussing the importance of popular
information and increasing visibility of legal problems).
337. Molly Ball, Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice Reform?,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
3,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/do-the-kochbrothers-really-care-about-criminal-justice-reform/386615/.
338. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 272, at 378.
339. Id. (“If a justice is in tune with his peer group, and his peers have elite views not shared
by most of the country, the justice will seem to be going his own way.”).
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John Conyers.340 Now, Black Lives Matter and conservatives
both recognize that civil asset forfeiture adversely affects their
economic interests.341 The only matter that Jeff Sessions and
leadership of Black Lives Matter may have agreed upon is that
civil asset forfeiture deprives property ownership without
sufficient due process.342 Not only are low-income African
American communities impacted by civil asset forfeiture,
wealthy white business owners have felt the brunt of property
deprivation as well through application of forfeiture to wire
fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering cases.343 The Justice
Department intervening in Brown was for similar reason—to
protect the country’s economic interests.344 Perhaps the
economic interest coupled with resistance-leaders will lead to
similar results. Recasting the message broadly as basic property deprivation helps diverse factions to understand the
problem.345 This joint message is one courts are more likely to
support openly because the Court’s legitimacy is questioned by
both conservative Whites and African Americans.346
Courts are also paying attention to the impact forfeiture has
on the lives of everyday people. An examination of various
federal and state forfeiture decisions signals to courts the
national attention civil forfeiture has received—citing to HBO
340. See HYDE, supra note 12, at 79–80; Attorney General Sessions Issues Policy and Guidelines
on Federal Adoptions of Assets Seized by State or Local Law Enforcement, DEP’T JUST. (July 17, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-policy-and-guidelinesfederal-adoptions-assets-seized-state [hereinafter General Sessions Issues Policy].
341. See General Sessions Issues Policy, supra note 340; supra Part I.
342. General Sessions Issues Policy, supra note 340.
343. United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 261 Fed.
App’x 355 (2d Cir. 2008).
344. Derek Bell attributed the NAACP Brown victory to the increased concern of returning
African American soldiers, their resistance attitudes, and changing economic conditions. Bell’s
interest convergence theory later proved true. The Justice Department intervened in Brown, in
large part, because the Executive Branch was concerned with the U.S. international image—an
image that would impact its economic opportunities. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 19–24 (2d ed. 2012).
345. Id. at 70–74 (explaining binary thinking and its effects on racial progress).
346. As an example, the framing of the abortion debate remains critical to how the public
perceives the issue. Subsequent to the Roe decision, the women’s movement shifted from an
agency lens to a more moderate right-to-choose lens. The movement adopted aspects of framing
theory and began to frame the issue as one of a women’s right to privacy. This shift was a direct
result of how the Roe Court framed the issue. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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specials and newspaper articles as examples of the inequality of
asset seizure.347 Generally, courts’ reasoning aligns with the
policy that forfeiture practice leads to inequitable results.348
These forfeiture protest data349 appear to have also reached
the Supreme Court. Justice Thomas continues to question the
value of relying on the historical application of civil forfeiture.350
Most recently, in a denial of certiorari in a civil forfeiture case,
Justice Thomas wrote, “In the absence of this historical practice,
the Constitution presumably would require the Court to align
its distinct doctrine governing civil forfeiture with its doctrines
governing other forms of punitive state action and property
deprivation.”351 More significantly, Justice Thomas questioned
“[w]hether this Court’s treatment of the broad modern
forfeiture practice can be justified by the narrow historical one
is certainly worthy of consideration in greater detail.”352
Certainly worthy of consideration, and the Black Lives Matter
movement has the power and protest data to demonstrate the
need to change civil forfeiture practices.
Black Lives Matter is prime in framing civil asset forfeiture.
Justice Thomas suggests that the timing to revisit the issue may
be right.353 Although the Court may refuse to shift the Equal
Protection standard, as Justice Thomas has argued, “[t]he Court
should abandon the pretense that anything other than policy
preferences underlies its balancing of constitutional rights and
interests in any given case.”354
As Vincent Warren appropriately stated, “Law for Black
347. See, e.g., United States v. $106,647 in United States Currency, 93 F. Supp. 3d 419, 423 (D.
Md. 2015) (referencing a 2015 Washington Post article on civil forfeiture abuse); State v.
Sprunger, 458 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO
television broadcast Oct. 5, 2014)) (stating “civil forfeiture has recently been a topic of national
conversation . . .”).
348. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017).
349. Big data had become a means to capture information on protest events, including
documenting those in attendance. See Kraig Beyerlein et al., A New Picture of Protest: The National
Study of Protest Events, SOC. METHODS & RES. 1, 2–5 (2016).
350. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 849.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 850.
353. Id.
354. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016).
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Lives is about creating radical innovation in the way we think
about our work as lawyers . . . into actually envisioning a legal
document that includes fundamental, basic rights, and
recognizes the humanity of Black people. We are planting the
seed.”355 The Black Lives Matter movement is harvesting these
seeds and the Court needs to pay attention.
CONCLUSION
The deaths of unarmed pedestrians heightened community
outrage over police practices and reinforced the notion that
various actions in society are legal, but morally reprehensible.
The deaths of Michael Brown and Trayvon Martin are two
glaring examples. The racial disparities in the criminal justice
system and the direct consequences of discriminatory application of civil asset forfeiture are also problematic.
Nearly seventy years ago in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court
stated that “freedom from discrimination by the States in the
enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives
sought to be effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”356 Yet, the Court disregards this objective and
reasons that the disproportionate impact civil asset forfeiture
has on communities of color falls within the broad police power
of the state.357 Therefore, from a practical perspective, the “cop
on the beat” has unbridled power to seize private property358
and has become the last word for civil asset forfeiture.
In the words of Curtis Mayfield, Black Lives Matter needs
to “keep on pushing” to change this injustice.359 Keep
pushing to show the disparate impact discriminatory polic355. Shah et al., supra note 326, at 106.
356. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
357. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1995); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
358. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453–56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When the property sought to
be forfeited has been entrusted by its owner to one who uses it for crime, however, the Constitution apparently assigns to the States and to the political branches of the Federal Government
the primary responsibility for avoiding that result.”).
359. In 1964, musical legend Curtis Mayfield wrote “Keep on Pushing” as a protest song.
The song surprised many when it became a hit on the pop charts. Biography, CURTIS MAYFIELD,
http://www.curtismayfield.com/biography.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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ing and civil asset forfeiture have on Black and Brown lives;
keep on pushing to show the Supreme Court that its
legitimacy will be questioned until it recognizes these discriminatory practices; and keep pushing until the Court
ends law enforcement’s ability to further displace property
ownership from African Americans and other low-income
communities of color.
“So in the dark we hide the heart that bleeds,
And wait, and tend our agonizing seeds.”360

360. CULLEN, supra note 1.

